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Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information?  
Evidence from Syndicated Lending 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates important contemporary issues relating to hedge fund involvement in the 
syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise 
due to the lack of regulation relating to hedge funds permissible dual holding of loans and short 
positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence of possible trading on private 
information in the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to the public announcements of both 
loan origination and loan renegotiation (amendments). In addition, our results show that hedge 
funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, low credit quality firms in comparison to bank 
lenders. Our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulation of 
the hedge fund industry. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past decade, hedge funds have made significant inroads into the syndicated loan 
market. In particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that hedge funds are willing to lend to 
borrowers that commercial banks are unwilling to lend to.1 As of 2005, hedge funds and other 
institutional investors provided almost 50% of the $509 billion loans made in the “highly 
leveraged” segment of the syndicated loan market. The entry of hedge funds into these markets 
raises a number of important questions and issues that hitherto have not been addressed. In 
particular, we investigate what are the potential and actual conflicts of interest that arise due to 
lack of regulation with respect to hedge funds participating in syndicated lending, while at the 
same time being able to trade (short) the stocks of borrowing firms. This issue is especially 
crucial since hedge fund loan originators are privy to private information about the performance 
of borrowing firms around loan origination and loan renegotiation/amendment dates. 
Recently, there have been public concerns about hedge fund involvements in corporate 
lending. An article in the Business Week on October 31, 2005 voiced these apprehensions: “a 
new breed of lender is stepping in: Hedge funds are providing hundreds of millions of dollars to 
companies whose shaky credit disqualifies them for prime bank loans or whose needs are too 
puny to attract big commercial bankers. But with the new source of capital come new dangers, 
including the possibility that hedge funds will make risky loans and exploit information gained as 
lenders to benefit their trading gambits…”. These concerns are consistent with the recognized 
difference between the objectives and expertise of hedge funds and traditional lenders such as 
                                                 
1 James Sprayregen, a bankruptcy lawyer with Kirkland & Ellis LLP in Chicago says, “They (hedge funds) are 
willing to take more risk for more return. And they are agnostic about outcomes as long as they are protected.” 
Further, an article in Business Week, Hedges: The New Corporate ATMs, October 2005, mentions that hedge funds 
are willing to cut deals quickly, without the red tape big banks require meeting regulator's demands. As one 
anonymous hedge fund executive mentioned, “We do an enormous amount of analysis very fast and provide these 
companies with rescue financing that allows them to preserve value in their businesses.”  
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commercial banks (see for example Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985)). Specifically, hedge 
funds may seek to maximize their short term profits while commercial banks tend to maximize 
their long term profits by building “customer relationships” over time.  Indeed, prior research has 
shown strong support for a relationship effect when a loan is extended by commercial banks. 
What has not been established is whether, or how, short term profit maximizers (such as hedge 
funds) are different from long term profit maximizers especially in protecting their clients' 
interests when originating loans. Accordingly, in this paper we investigate this potential conflict 
of interest by hedge fund as lenders when they participate in syndicated lending. In general, the 
empirical evidence supports the view that the capital market discounts the share price of a 
company who announces borrowing from hedge funds.2 As a result, one potential profitable 
strategy to benefit from the private information generated during the loan origination process is 
to short sell the equity of the borrower prior to loan announcements. Accordingly, in this paper 
we investigate the short-selling of the borrowers’ equity prior to new hedge fund loan 
announcements benchmarked against similar announcements of loans by banks. 
Anecdotally, it is known that hedge funds enforce very strict covenants on the loans they 
grant to financially troubled firms. Failure to comply with these financial covenants results in a 
technical default of the credit agreement. As a result, this gives lenders the right to reevaluate the 
financial position of the borrower and decide whether or not to amend existing loan contracts.  
For example, this might include changing the covenants of a loan, increasing or decreasing the 
loan interest rate, the loan’s maturity, and/or the principal amount.3 During this process of 
                                                 
2 Indeed, during the period 2005 to 2007, we find the capital market reacts positively for bank loans where the 
cumulative abnormal return is 1.52% during (0, +5) window and it is significant at 5% while the market reacts 
negatively to announcement of the hedge fund loans the cumulative abnormal return is -1.29% during (0, +5) 
window and it is significant at 10%. 
3 Maskin and Moore (1999) argue that renegotiation is an issue that arises largely as an out-of-equilibrium 
phenomenon and could provide pareto improvement over bankruptcy. 
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renegotiation lenders obtain “new” private information about the future performance of the 
borrower and thus a conflict of interest might arise when hedge fund lenders take advantage of 
this private information and trade on it in the market for the borrowing firm’s equity. For 
example, on March 6, 2006, executives from Movie Gallery, a large movie rental chain, held a 
private conference call for their lenders –many of which were hedge funds– to discuss how new 
challenges facing the industry had caused the company to recognize a record loss of $522 
million.4 These losses violated one of the major covenants of a $1.35 billion syndicated loan 
extended by hedge funds such as Highland Capital Management, Canyon Capital, and Silver 
Point Capital. The Movie Gallery executives requested that their lenders amend existing loan 
contracts and relax existing financial covenants.5 Nearly two weeks after the private conference 
call, Movie Gallery publicly announced their syndicated loan covenant amendments to the public 
(on March 17, 2006). However, after the conference call of March 6, 2006 and before the 
announcement of March 17, 2006 short-selling of Movie Gallery’s stock skyrocketed. In 
particular, between March 7, 2006 and March 13, 2006 the weekly cumulative short sale volume 
increased from 0.4 (1.23% of the outstanding shares) to 3.04 million shares (9.5% of the 
outstanding shares). By March 13, 2006, Movie Gallery’s stock price had plummeted by 61% as 
its closing price dropped from $3.27 on March 6, 2006 to $2.01 on March 13, 2006.  
The above example and many such similar examples raise a serious regulatory policy 
concern about hedge funds’ common practices of acting as both lenders to, and equity investors 
in, the same firm. In comparison to commercial banks, hedge funds are unregulated vis-à-vis 
their equity holdings (either long or short), have fewer information barriers between those in the 
                                                 
4 See The New York Times cover story, “As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny” by Jenny Anderson, 
October 16, 2006. 
 
5 Movie Gallery incurred significant fees related to this amendment including a 50 basis point upfront fee totaling 
$4.5 million and various administrative fees.  
   
  
   
5
hedge fund who initiate loans and those who trade in the equity of the borrowing firm. For 
example, a hedge fund trader of loans, who may have access to material private information 
regarding a borrowing firm, may face weak “Chinese walls” in trading the equity of the 
borrowing firm— or, in some cases, may even be the same person.  
Regulators in some countries have expressed concern with respect to this issue. For 
example, in Britain the Financial Services Authority is examining whether hedge funds are 
illegally using sensitive private information gathered as lenders when they trade a company’s 
bonds and stocks.6  In the US, the SEC has tried to force hedge fund advisers to register with the 
commission, but a federal court overturned its ruling in 2006. Now lawmakers in the US have 
introduced several bills in the House and Senate to give the SEC the authority it lost in court.7  
Indeed, recently, the SEC charged Blue River Capital for failing to have internal information 
barriers in place to prevent the misuse of sensitive privately obtained information garnered in the 
process of lending. 
These uncertainties and potential conflicts have not stopped companies from lining up to 
borrow from hedge funds. The list of the companies turning to “alternative lenders” includes U-
Haul International's parent, AMERCO, Krispy Kreme, Aloha Airlines, textile manufacturer Dan 
River, Tower Automotive Inc., SLS International Inc. and Salton Inc., which makes George 
Foreman grills.8  
To investigate the potential conflict of interest of hedge fund involvement in syndicated 
lending we collected data from a number of different databases. The source of our loan data is 
                                                 
6 See the Business Week editorial article, The Invisible Lenders, October 31, 2005. 
7 See Reuters article, Momentum Grows for U.S. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration, May 07, 2009. 
8 In the first quarter of 2007, $7.5 billion was raised for distressed securities funds, mounting to a record $80.3 
billion in 238 funds, according to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago. Funds that invest in distressed debt rose 0.95% 
in June 2007 and are up 9.1% year-to-date, according to the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index. That 
outperformed the fund’s general index which rose 0.78% in June and 8.7% year-to-date, Reuters July 23, 2007. 
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the DealScan database provided by Reuters’ Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). Because of the 
lack of formal regulation for hedge funds, one of the major challenges of hedge fund research is 
to build a hedge fund database that can address the questions raised above. One important aspect 
of our paper is that we build a comprehensive database using seven major hedge fund data bases 
including the TASS Hedge Funds Database (TASS), the Hedge Fund Research database (HFR), 
Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets database (CISDM) and Private 
Equity Information Hedge Fund Database (PEI). Our source of short-sales data is REGSHO.  
To address the general public concerns regarding conflicts of interest in equity trading, 
prior to hedge fund loan origination announcements, we employ multiple approaches to control 
for potential endogeneity and self selection bias. In particular, we employ propensity score 
matching and switching regressions with endogenous switching. Our overall results show that 
short-selling of a borrower’s equity prior to the loan origination date is significantly larger for 
hedge fund borrowers in comparison to that of matched borrowing firms who financed their 
loans from banks.  
We then focus on loan amendments, since prior to loan amendments lenders necessarily 
have private information about the borrowers expected future performance. Such private 
information may include information on the perceived financial weakness of the borrower which 
led to the existing loan contract being renegotiated. Thus, any observed differences in short-
selling activity around loan amendments are more likely to be attributable to taking advantage of  
private information on borrower quality deterioration. By contrast short-selling of borrowers’ 
equity at the time of loan origination, could also be attributed to potential hedging activities of 
the lenders. Consistent with the Movie Gallery example above, we find strong evidence 
supporting trading on private information in the equity of hedge fund borrowers just prior to loan 
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amendment dates in comparison to that found in the bank borrowers sample. Specifically, 
average “abnormal” short-selling is positive and significant prior to amendment date 
announcements for the hedge fund borrowers and its mean difference from bank borrowers is 
positive and significant at 1% level. Using a simple trading strategy, based on actual or abnormal 
short-selling volume around loan amendment announcement dates, we show that short-selling 
prior to a loan amendment date is economically significant and profitable for the equity of hedge 
fund borrowers while it is not profitable for the equity of bank borrowers. Our results are robust 
to various sample specifications including restricting our hedge fund loans to stand alone hedge 
fund lenders only, sorting loan amendments based on the outcome of the negotiations (favorable 
and unfavorable), and sorting loan amendments into quintiles based on changes in the credit 
quality of the borrower post-loan origination and prior to loan amendments. 
Our paper is closely related to the literature on recent changes that have altered the 
structure of the syndicated loan market and which has brought into focus the potential conflict of 
interest that may exist when non-bank financial institutions participate in the syndicated 
lending.9 In a recent paper, Ivashina and Sun (2007) study the potential conflicts of interest that 
arise when institutional managers simultaneously make syndicated loans as well as hold the 
equity of borrowing firms. However, their paper does not consider short positions taken in the 
equity of borrowing firms nor does it explicitly analyze participation by hedge funds. Jiang, Li, 
and Shao (2008) analyze dual holdings, i.e., the simultaneous holding of both equity and debt 
                                                 
9 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the introduction of loan ratings opened the door for institutional investors such as 
hedge funds to enter the loan market which led to an increase in the availability of financing in the syndicated loan 
market (see, Mullineaux and Yi (2006) and Sufi (2009)). Nandy and Shao (2007) provide an analysis of institutional 
investment in the syndicated loan market and show that institutions primarily act as lenders of last resort, charging 
higher spreads and lending to poorer credit quality borrowers, compared to commercial banks. Nini (2008) 
documents how the entry of non-banks increased the credit availability to lower quality firms. During the same time, 
the secondary loan trading market also greatly expanded in scope: see Gande and Saunders (2006) who analyze the 
secondary loan market and show that when a borrower's existing loans trade for the first time in the secondary 
market, it elicits a positive stock price response.  
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claims of the same company by non-bank institutional investors. They, however, do not analyze 
any potential conflict of interest nor do they explicitly investigate if hedge funds engage in such 
a conflict of interest. Our paper is also broadly related to conflicts of interest that may arise in 
financial intermediaries in other markets, such as those analyzed by Bodnaruk, Massa and 
Simonov (2007), who investigate the potential of information leakage around M&A events from 
the deal advisors to their investment arms within a financial conglomerate.  
 Consequently, this paper complements the existing literature and makes four additional 
contributions. First, ours is the first paper to provide compelling evidence linking private 
information flows from the syndicated loan market to short-selling in the equity market. Second, 
our paper differentiates potential conflicts of interest based on the type of lender: banks, hedge 
funds, and other non-bank institutional investors. Third, our paper provides significant insights 
into the current debate regarding the regulation of hedge funds. Finally, we outline and build a 
comprehensive hedge fund database using seven major data sources, thus contributing to future 
research on hedge fund investments holdings and strategies.10, 11  
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our hypothesis. In section III, 
we describe our data. In Section IV we present our empirical methodology and related variables. 
Section V presents the empirical results. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
10 Our paper is also related to the literature on loan renegotiation. In the theoretical literature a large stream of 
research has analyzed the incentive to renegotiate a loan contract as a result of an exogenous shock that affected 
borrower characteristics and rendered the existing loan contract inefficient. See, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 
(1994), Harris and Raviv (1995), Maskin and Moore (1999), Gorton and Kahn (2000), Tirole (2006), and Garleanu 
and Zwiebel (2007) among others. A number of papers have also empirically investigated loan renegotiation and the 
information content of such restructurings (see, Brown, James, and Mooradian (1993)). Roberts and Sufi (2008) is 
most closely related to our study, and show that the determinants of renegotiation depend on the accrual of new 
information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as 
macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions. 
11 There are also a number of studies that focus primarily on the outcome and implications of violations of 
covenants, see, e.g., Beneish and Press (1993, 1995), Chen and Wei (1993), Smith (1993), Chava and Roberts 
(2007), and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2007).  Another set of papers investigate the outcome of ex-post bargaining in 
payment default and bankruptcy, see, e.g., Gilson (1990), Gilson, John, and Kang (1990), Asquith, Gertner, and 
Scharfstein (1994), and Benmelech and Bergman (2007). 
 
   
  
   
9
II. Hypotheses  
In this section we develop testable hypotheses to frame the potential conflict of interest 
that may arise due to the lack of regulation relating to hedge funds' simultaneous involvement in 
both syndicated lending and the short-selling of equity in borrowing firms. If equity short-selling 
activities are driven by loan hedging motives, then we should expect to see short-selling 
increasing from its “normal” levels just after or immediately around the public announcement of 
the new or amended loan contract. On the other hand, if abnormal short-selling activities are 
observed prior to loan announcements then it is more likely to be related to trading activity that 
exploits private information gathered during the loan origination and/or renegotiation process. In 
particular, we believe that the cleanest test for trading on private information in a borrowing 
firm’s equity will be just prior to loan renegotiation announcements given the private knowledge 
of actual or impending financial weaknesses that may affect existing loan contracts. In general, 
regardless of who initiates loan amendments the lender gets access to this private information. 
Consequently, we test the following two hypotheses (H1 and H2): 
 
• Hypothesis 1 (H1): The equity of the firms that have hedge funds as lenders are more 
likely to be short sold prior to public announcement of loan originations.  
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): The equity of the firms that have hedge funds as lenders are more 
likely to be short sold prior to loan amendment dates. Further, such short-selling is likely 
to be greater the weaker the financial situation of the borrower.  
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III. Data and Sample Construction 
III. A.  Loan Database 
We use loan information from the DealScan database provided by Reuters’ Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC) and restrict our loan sample to run from 1995 to the first quarter of 200812, 
due to the fact that the number of hedge fund and institutional borrower loans prior to 1995 were 
relatively small (Sufi (2009) and Nandy and Shao (2007)). We remove observations with missing 
borrower names, deal active dates, facility active dates, facility amount, all-in-drawn-spreads, or 
loan maturities and then restrict our loan sample again to include revolver loans and term loans 
made only to U.S. borrowers. We merge our loan sample with Compustat and CRSP either by 
borrower ticker and year of loan origination or by borrower name when the ticker information is 
missing in DealScan.13 After merging, our loan sample consists of 21,830 loans at the deal level 
consisting of 30,832 loan facilities.  
III.B. The Hedge Fund Databases 
 Due to the absence of strict regulations regarding reporting requirements, there is no 
single comprehensive database on hedge funds and/or hedge fund management firms. One 
crucial step therefore is to identify syndicated loan lenders that are hedge funds or hedge fund 
management firms. In order to accomplish this task, we exploit seven major hedge fund data 
bases that have been widely used in the prior literature, namely: the TASS Hedge Funds 
Database (TASS), the Hedge Fund Research database (HFR), Center for International Securities 
and Derivatives Markets database (CISDM), Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers 2004 to 
2006 (Nelson), Institutional Investor magazine’s annual Hedge Fund 100 List (II100) 2003 to 
2007, the database of Cottier (1997), and the Private Equity Information Hedge Fund Database 
                                                 
12 We restrict the sample to the first quarter of 2008 based on the data availability when we conducted our tests.  
13 Finally, as some borrowers in DealScan are subsidiaries of publicly traded companies, we matched their parents’ 
information to Compustat and CRSP. 
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(PEI), which collects hedge fund information from SEC ADV forms. Each of the seven listed 
sources reports both hedge fund names and their managing companies names.  
We compile a comprehensive list of hedge funds from these sources by including hedge 
fund names from TASS (4,590 firms and 10,838 funds), HFR (2,328 firms and 8,052 funds), 
CISDM (4,058 firms and 12,367 funds), Nelson (288 firms and 639 funds), II100 (170 firms and 
603 funds), Cottier’s (28 firms and 34 funds), and PEI (6,555 firms and 27,338 funds) at both the 
fund level and the firm level. We identify and remove duplicate observations by checking hedge 
fund names and their addresses from our compiled hedge fund database. Specifically, when 
observations from PEI are duplicated with those from one or more of the other six sources, we 
keep the former to preserve the information from SEC’s ADV forms.  We do this separately at 
both the management firm as well as the fund level. 
 Many hedge fund management firms, especially large ones, have more than one 
functional area. For example, the II100 2007 Hedge Fund List ranked J.P. Morgan Asset 
Management as the largest hedge fund firm. However, the company manages different asset 
classes other than hedge funds, such as fixed income, currency, real estate, infrastructure, and 
private equity, etc… Therefore it is particularly difficult to define hedge funds at the managing 
firm level. Fortunately, investment advisers managing assets of $25 million or more are 
generally required to register with the SEC and to file ADV forms. Using the information on the 
ADV forms (from PEI) and following Griffin and Xu (2007) and Huang (2008), we are able to 
apply the following criteria to observations from PEI to define a hedge fund management firm: 
the company charges performance-based fees, and at least 50% of its clients are “high net worth 
individuals” or at least 50% of its clients are in “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge 
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funds)”.14 After excluding duplicates and hedge fund firms that do not meet these criteria, we 
end up with a comprehensive hedge fund sample comprising 9,525 unique hedge fund 
management firm names and 48,601 unique fund names with detailed hedge fund information 
from each source. 
 III.C. Construction of Hedge Fund-Syndicated Loan Sample  
Finally, we construct our sample of syndicated loan lenders who are hedge funds by 
merging DealScan lender names with hedge fund names (at both the management firm level and 
fund level). We verify the robustness of the merged results by comparing lender domiciles from 
DealScan with hedge fund addresses, and by conducting web-based searches for merged lender 
names and hedge fund names. Our merged hedge fund lenders include the following four sub-
cases: (1) A lender in DealScan is defined as a hedge fund or a hedge fund management 
company according to our hedge fund databases, e.g. Ares Leveraged Investment Fund II LP, a 
lender in DealScan, is defined as a hedge fund managed by Ares Management LLC according to 
PEI. (2) A lender in DealScan is a subsidiary of a hedge fund management company, e.g. 
DealScan records Cyrus Opportunities Master Fund Ltd as a lender, its management company, 
Cyrus Capital Partners, L.P., is recorded as a hedge fund management company. (3) A hedge 
fund or a hedge fund company is a subsidiary of a lender in DealScan, e.g., New York Life 
Capital Partners is a hedge fund company, and its parent, New York Life Capital Corp, is 
recorded as a lender in DealScan. (4) A lender is defined as a hedge fund company in some 
hedge fund database(s), but this lender could also have other functional areas, such as in the case 
of J.P. Morgan Asset Management we mentioned before. When (3) or (4) occurs, we consider 
the lender to be a hedge fund only if the loan(s) made by the lender are defined as institutional 
                                                 
14 However, this problem could not be totally eliminated, because the other six hedge fund databases may still 
contain hedge fund management companies with multiple functional areas. 
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loan(s) by DealScan. We find 341 unique lender names in our DealScan loan sample that can be 
identified as hedge funds (193) or as hedge fund management firms (148).  
Once the hedge fund sample has been defined, we then divide our Dealscan syndicated 
loan sample into three distinct lender categories: hedge fund lender, other institutional lender, 
and commercial bank lender. The hedge fund lender category consists of all loan deals where at 
least one of the 341 hedge fund lenders participated in the loan. We define institutional loan 
facilities following Nandy and Shao (2007). If DealScan reports one of the market segments for 
the loan facility as “institutional” and if none of the lenders involved in the facility are hedge 
funds, we define the loan deal as “other institutional”. Our bank lender category comprises loan 
deals where all lenders are banks.15 Finally, we remove overlapping loan deals within 60 trading 
days of the same borrower. This leaves us with 1,844 (12.59%), 543 (3.71%), and 12,254 
(83.70%) loan deals for the hedge fund lender, other institutional lender, and bank lender 
categories respectively. Roberts and Sufi (2008) have highlighted certain shortcomings in the 
DealScan database. In their sample, they found that 47% of loan renegotiations (amendments) 
are recorded as independent loan observations. Following their approach, we hand checked all 
loan contracts between January 2, 2005 to July 7, 2007.16 Importantly, this is the sub-period over 
which short-selling data is actually available and is thus the focus of this paper. During this 
sample period, we were able to identify 217 amended deals from a total of 577 new loans 
contracts on DealScan. Recognizing the special characteristics of the amended loans we wrote an 
algorithm to identify the amended loans for the rest of the sample.17   As a result, for the period 
                                                 
15 If any borrower in the hedge fund lender loan sample also has loans made by banks or other institutions, we keep 
the observations in the hedge fund lender sample only. 
16 Since our short-selling data is only available for this period, January 2, 2005 to July 7, 2007.  
17 We develop an algorithm to capture loan amendments: for any given borrower, a loan is defined as a loan 
amendment if the loan deal happens before the maturity of a previous deal and at least 10 percent of lead lenders in 
the previous loan remain unchanged. 
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from 1995 to the first quarter of 2008,18, we identify 7,808 new loans from 14,641 loans from 
DealScan. The sample breakdown is shown in Table I Panel A, while Table I Panel B shows the 
number of unique borrowers in each lender category. Further description of the loan sample is 
presented in Table I Panel C breaks down the sample by industry using a 4-digit SIC code based 
on industry classes as defined by Fama and French. As can be seen, there is a diverse set of 
borrowers with no industry comprising more than 16% of any one subsample.  
<Insert Table I> 
III.D. Short-Selling Data 
On June 23 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
Regulation SHO (REGSHO) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. According to REGSHO, 
all Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) had to make tick-data of short-sales available to the 
public after January 1st 2005. These short-sales data include information on ticker name, short-
sale volume, short-sale price, transaction time and date, listing exchange, and trade type. These 
data are available from January 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007 (after which the mandatory public 
disclosure of short-sale data was eliminated).  
We collected short-sale information on stocks traded on nine major U.S. exchanges from 
the NYSE TAQ database, and from the websites of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ), National Stock 
Exchange (NSX), Archipelago (ARCA), Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), Chicago Stock 
Exchange (CHX), National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange (PHLX). We first aggregated the raw data at the transaction level to a daily level by 
ticker symbol, trading date and the stock exchange on which the stock was traded (some stocks 
                                                 
18 Although the short-selling data is only available from January 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007, for completeness we 
extend our sample from 1995 to the first quarter of 2008. 
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might be traded on more than one exchange). Next, we merged this daily short-sale database 
with CRSP daily equity price data by ticker and date, and verified our merged results by 
comparing the daily average short-sale prices with CRSP stock prices. We exclude short-sales of 
stocks not listed in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and generate aggregated daily non-exempted 
short-sale volumes for each stock in our sample from January 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007. This 
leaves us with short-sales data on 3,117, 1,353 and 3,915 NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, 
respectively. We then merge the short-sale data to the syndicated loan sample borrowers. 
III.E. Loan Amendments Sample Construction 
In this paper we focus our main attention on the potential for hedge fund trading on 
private information prior to the public announcement of loan amendments. We measure “trading 
on private information” in terms of short-selling the equity of the firm to whom the hedge fund 
amended a loan prior to the public loan amendment announcement date. As discussed in section 
III.D comprehensive data for short-selling is only available from January 2 2005 to July 6 2007. 
Accordingly, we focus our attention on loan amendments for this time period. We obtain our 
loan amendment sample from two sources: (i). loan amendments as defined by DealScan 
database and (ii). hand-collected amendments from borrower filings with the SEC from forms 
10-K, 10-Q and 8-K mentioned in section III.C. In total we have 113 (hedge fund) and 263 
(bank) loan amendments that can be confirmed with SEC filings and merged with short-selling 
data, in the hedge fund and bank lender samples, respectively. From SEC filings we collect the 
following information: the announcement date of the amendment (we take the filing date as the 
announcement date if there is no explicit announcement date in the filing), as well as any 
changes in the principal amount, interest rate and/or maturity.  
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We define “favorable” amendment changes as larger principal amounts, lower interest 
rates or longer maturities for the amended loans. We defined “favorable” loan amendments in 
our sample as those loan amendments with at least one favorable term change, but with no 
unfavorable loan term changes, where an unfavorable loan amendment change involves smaller 
principal, a higher interest rate and/or a shorter maturity. Our hedge fund lender sample contains 
76 favorable amendments and 37 non-favorable (or unfavorable) amendments, whereas the bank 
lender sample contains 126 favorable amendments and 137 non-favorable (or unfavorable) 
amendments. 
 
IV. Methodology and Related Variables 
Our ultimate objective, with respect to test hypothesis 1, is to compare abnormal short-
selling19 of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior the public announcement of a loan 
origination compared to short-selling of the equity of bank borrowers. One concern with this 
comparison is that the decision to lend may be endogenous since the lender–borrower matching 
is nonrandom. Lenders (banks or hedge funds) to a certain extent self-select which loans to 
finance which in turn is likely to be related to observed firm characteristics such as borrower’s 
size, leverage, financial risk. This self-selection issue can be controlled for using different 
econometric techniques. Specifically, in this paper we use two commonly employed econometric 
techniques to control for potential endogeneity: (i) Propensity Score Matching (PSM), as 
described by Heckman (1979) and (ii) Switching Regression with Endogenous Switching 
                                                 
19 Following the short-selling literature, we use “abnormal” short-selling.  We define abnormal short-selling by 
adjusting the short-selling activities around the loan origination date by normal short-selling activities outside the 
event window (-120, -61).  We define our “normal” short-selling benchmark for any borrower, the average daily 
short-selling over the period from January 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007 but excluding event period(s) (-60,+60). The 
daily abnormal short-selling is the difference between the daily short-selling in the event window (-60, +60) and 
“normal” short-selling benchmark. We normalize the degree of short-selling by either outstanding shares 
(Short/SHROUT) or average daily volume prior the event window (Short/Avol). 
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(SRES) described by Maddala (1983, p. 282). The PSM approach conditions for selection on 
observables, while the switching regression framework accounts for selection on unobservables 
(through the inverse Mills-ratio) and also has the key advantage in that it gives estimates of 
(unobserved) counterfactual outcomes, Maddala (1983).  
To test H2 we examine the abnormal short-selling of equity prior to loan amendments for 
both hedge fund borrowers and banks borrowers. As discussed earlier, loan amendments are 
commonly triggered when the borrower violates covenants for reasons that include poor financial 
performance and deterioration in credit quality. In other cases, borrowers may want to 
renegotiate a loan contract due to their improved credit quality, which gives them the ability to 
refinance at lower rates. In general, the amendment circumstances ought to be similar for both 
hedge fund and bank borrowers which allows us to create a natural match or comparison 
between hedge fund borrowers and bank borrowers. Thus to test H2, we use a three stage 
approach. First, using univariate tests, we compare abnormal short-selling for hedge fund 
borrowers to that for bank borrowers prior to loan amendments. Second, we sort amendments 
based on the outcome of amendments (favorable or unfavorable), and then conduct a number of 
comparisons. Specifically, we compare abnormal short-selling of the equity of hedge fund 
borrowers based on both favorable and unfavorable loan amendments and then we repeat the 
same analysis for bank borrowers. Third, we then compare abnormal short-selling of the equity 
of hedge fund borrowers with those of bank borrowers based on separating the amendments type  
into favorable and unfavorable. Finally, we conduct an additional test that sorts amendments into 
quintiles based on the change in the borrowers credit quality measured over the period prior to 
and subsequent to the public loan amendment announcement and analyze the differences in 
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abnormal short-selling of borrower’s equity by hedge funds versus banks prior to the amendment 
announcement of borrowing firms.20 
IV.A. Propensity Score Matching Model  
To test H1, we first employ propensity score matching. The propensity score tests allow 
us to examine abnormal short-selling activities of the treatment (hedge fund) sample of 
(borrowing) firms, in comparison to a matched bank control group of borrowing firms. These 
tests are implemented in four steps. In the first step, we utilize logistic regression where the 
binary dependent variable is one for loans financed by a hedge fund and zero for loans financed 
by banks. This allows us to identify the characteristics of borrowers who are more likely to 
obtain financing from hedge funds rather than traditional bank lenders. We include a number of 
market and accounting variables that a priori measure the performance and riskiness of a 
borrowing firm. In particular, we include a borrower’s leverage, Altman Z-score and expected 
default frequency (EDF) as measures of financial riskiness while we include profitability and 
growth of sales as measures of firm performance. We also include size, cash flow, institutional 
ownership, Beta, momentum and idiosyncratic risk as additional borrowing firm control 
variables.  In the second step, we calculate each firm’s propensity score based on the probability 
that a firm with given characteristics will be financed by a hedge fund. In the third step, firms are 
matched using Leuven and Sianesi’s (2003) propensity score matching procedure to the nearest 
neighborhood within a 0.8 caliper. In the final step, we employ univariate tests to compare the 
abnormal short-selling of the equity of matched commercial banks and hedge fund borrowing 
firms around loan origination dates.  
 
                                                 
20 The essential idea is the private information on a borrower weakness is likely to be reflected in the borrower’s 
subsequent performance. 
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IV.B. Switching Regression with Endogenous Switching (SRES) 
A potential source of endogeneity is that there may be unobserved factors or private 
information that affects loan self-selection by borrowers. To address this issue we use Switching 
Regressions with Endogenous Switching (SRES) since this can account for unobservables not 
factored into PSM (which is based on observables). In addition, one of the important features of 
SRES is that it allows us to ask “what-if” type of questions. For example, for a loan extended by 
hedge funds, what would the alternative abnormal short-selling activity level have been for the 
same borrower’s equity had it been extended by a bank? The model consists of a binary outcome 
equation in the first stage, that reflects the matching between the borrower and the lender, and 
two regression equations in the second stage, for each type of borrower (hedge fund and bank) 
on the variable of interest, here short-selling of their equity. This model appears in Fang (2005) 
in her study of the relationship between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of 
bond underwriting services and recently in Nandy and Shao (2007) in their study on institutional 
loans. It is a generalization of the two-stage model used in Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) and 
Puri (1996), which studies the entry of commercial banks into the bond underwriting market. In 
these papers the authors use a similar two-stage model, except that instead of two equations for 
the variable of interest for the two financial institution groups, there is one second-stage 
equation, which in effect restricts the coefficients to be the same across bank types. Relaxing this 
equality of coefficients makes the model more general since, as already discussed above, there is 
no reason to believe that the two types of lenders will engage in short-selling in a similar manner.  
In the first stage, we estimate a Probit regression model where the binary dependent 
variable is one for loans financed by a hedge fund and zero for loans financed by banks. To 
control for selection bias, we introduce the inverse Mills-ratio in the second stage as an 
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additional regressor where we estimate the factors that explain the ex-ante short-selling of the 
equity of the two types of borrowers (hedge fund and bank) using OLS. This two-stage 
estimation method yields consistent estimates (Heckman (1979) and Maddala (1983)). To infer 
the impact of hedge fund participation in loans on the ex-ante abnormal short-selling activities of 
the borrower’s equity, we compute the difference between the actual abnormal short-selling 
activities for the hedge fund (bank) borrower’s equity and the hypothetical abnormal short-
selling activities for the same borrower’s equity had the loan been made by a bank (hedge fund). 
If the difference is positive, then the hypothetical abnormal short-selling of the borrower’s equity 
is lower for bank borrowers than the actual abnormal short-selling by hedge fund borrowers, thus 
providing support for our hypotheses.  
Implementing the SRES model requires specifying two sets of variables: those 
determining the selection of the borrowers (in the first stage) and those determining the short-
selling activities prior the public announcement of the loan (in the second stage). In the first 
stage, we need at least one variable that is correlated with lending self-selection (an instrument) 
that is not correlated with the short-selling activities in the second stage. In addition to the 
market and accounting variables discussed in the PSM model above, we propose to include 
cumulative loan amount borrowed by a firm in the past five years interacted with a high leverage 
borrower dummy as an instrumental variable. The cumulative loan amount is defined as the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus the cumulative amount of loans (in million dollars) that a borrower 
has borrowed over the past 5 years. We interact this with a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
loan is classified as a highly leveraged loan and zero otherwise.21 The more positive this 
interaction variable the more likely it is that next loan will come from a hedge fund. This is 
                                                 
21 In order to define a highly leveraged loan, we use the DealScan’s classification in market segment, or the 
definition of a highly leveraged loans as set by SEC regulators, who define it as loans to companies whose debts 
exceed 75% of assets after a transaction, or whose debts double and rise to a level that is more than 50% of assets. 
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because hedge funds have focused on lending to the highly leveraged borrower segment of the 
syndicated loan market. This instrumental variable should not be correlated with abnormal short-
selling behavior since the market is aware of the highly levered status of the borrowers. 
IV.C. Related Variables 
 Table II Panel A summarizes the different variables we use in our tests. Panel A.1 
summarizes the borrowing firm control variables, Panel A.2 summarizes the loan characteristics 
and Panel A.3 summarizes the instrumental variables. The variables in Panel A.1 comprise a 
wide variety of performance measures – both accounting and market based reflecting a 
borrowing firm’s performance and default risk exposures. Specifically, all operating 
performances variables are measured using COMPUSTAT data at the last fiscal year-end at least 
3 months prior to the loan origination date.  
Firm size refers to the natural logarithm of total assets and Altman’s Z score is a measure 
of borrower quality.22 The cash/assets ratio refers to the ratio of cash and equivalents to total 
assets, the net worth/assets ratio is defined as net worth divided by total assets, EBIT/assets ratio 
is defined as earnings before interests and tax divided by total assets, Book to Market refers to 
the book-to-market ratio of equity, Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book 
value of assets, leverage is measured as the sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets, sales growth refers to the average rate of sales growth over 3 years prior 
to loan origination date, profit margin is defined as the ratio of earnings to sales, the interest 
coverage ratio is measured as gross earnings divided by the sum of total interest expense and 
capitalized interests, the return on equity (ROE) refers to the ratio of net income to equity and 
                                                 
22 For manufacturing companies, Altman’s Z score is defined as 1.2× (Working Capitals/Total Assets) + 1.4× 
(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3× (EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6× (Mkt Value of Equity/ Book Value of Total 
Liabilities) + 1.0× Sales/Total Assets. For non-manufacturing companies, Z-score is defined as 6.56× (Working 
Capitals/Total Assets) + 3.26× (Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 6.72× (EBIT/Total Assets) + 1.05× (Mkt Value 
of Equity/ Book Value of Total Liabilities). See Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), Chapter 11. 
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return on assets (ROA) refers to the ratio of net income to total assets. The variable expected 
default frequency refers to the estimated probability of default based on Bharath and Shumway’s 
methodlogy (2004). Beta and RMSE are respectively the estimated market risk coefficients and 
root mean squared errors based on the market model, calculated over the interval (-312, -61) with 
respect to the loan origination date. Run-up is the holding period return over the same estimation 
window (-312, -61). Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors, measured as the average of the last 4 quarters ending at least 3 months prior to loan 
origination date. These variables are described in more detail in Appendix A. 
<Insert Table II> 
The variables in Panel A.2 consist of three dummy variables capturing loan 
characteristics: Investment Grade dummy, Covenant dummy and Secured loan dummy. 
Investment Grade dummy indicates whether the borrower was at investment grade at the loan 
close day. It equals to 1 if the S&P senior long-term debt was rated at “BBB” or higher and 0 
otherwise. Covenant dummy equals 1 if at least one facility of a loan has any covenant and 0 
otherwise. Secured dummy is an indicator of whether a loan deal is secured or not. It equals 1 if 
at least one facility is secured and 0 otherwise. 
The variables in Panel A.3 presents the instrumental variable, i.e., the interaction of a  
high leverage dummy with the cumulative loan amount borrowed in the past five years. We are 
using the definition of highly leveraged loans as one specified by the SEC regulators, who define 
it as loans to companies whose debts exceed 75% of assets after a transaction, or whose debts 
double and rise to a level that is more than 50% of assets. The dummy variable equal 1 if the 
loan is highly leveraged loan and zero otherwise. The cumulative loan amount equals the natural 
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logarithm of 1 plus the cumulative amount of loans (in million dollars) that a borrower has 
borrowed in the past 5 years.  
Table II Panel B reflects univariate differences among these variables for the hedge fund 
and bank lender samples using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Finally, Table II Panel C 
shows the correlations among these variables.  
 
V. Empirical Results 
The results are presented in Tables II to X and in Figures I to IV. The univariate tests, in 
Panel B.1 of Table II, showed that in comparison to borrowers in the bank lender sample, 
borrowers in the hedge fund sample are much larger, as measured by asset size, are more risky as 
measured by Altman Z-score and Expected Default Frequency (EDF), are more leveraged, have 
lower liquidity, have lower growth as measured by sales growth and Tobin’s-q and are less 
profitable as measured by ROA. In general, borrowers in the hedge fund lender sample appear to 
have lower ex-ante performance prospects in comparison to borrowers in the bank and other 
institutional lender sample. Table III presents the logit regression results together with the 
elasticity (economic importance) of each of the explanatory variables described above where the 
dependent variable is binary, i.e. 1 for hedge fund borrowers and 0 for bank borrowers. In Table 
III, we examine four alternative logit models to show the robustness of our results by including a 
new variable or an alternative variable in the logit tests.  In total we have 5,071 observations, 
although, the number of observations vary from model to model based on data availability for 
control variables.  
<Insert Table III> 
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As can be seen, from Table III our results are consistent with our univariate tests in Table 
II. In particular, we find that the coefficient on the leverage variable is positive and significant at 
the 1% level in all related specifications while EDF is positive (high EDF indicates a higher 
defaulting probability) and is significant at the 5% level in all specifications. Our results are also 
economically significant. For a 1% increase in leverage the probability of hedge fund 
undertaking lending increases by 0.62% (from its mean value), see Model I.  The results from the 
univariate tests and the logit tests are consistent with the view that hedge funds target so-called 
highly leveraged transaction borrowers.23 
V. A. Potential Conflicts of Interest Prior to Loan Origination Announcements (H1) 
Next we present our results for the potential conflict of interest that arises due to hedge 
funds simultaneous involvement in both originating syndicated loans and in the short-selling of 
the equity of borrowing firms. That is, we present tests of Hypothesis 1: The equity of the firms 
that have hedge funds as lenders is more likely to be short sold prior to public announcement of 
loan origination. Following the short-selling literature (for example, see the recent paper by 
Zheng (2008)), we use “abnormal” short-selling.  We define abnormal short-selling by adjusting 
the actual short-selling activities around the loan origination date by normal short-selling 
activities outside the event window (-120, -61).24 We define our “normal” short-selling 
benchmark for any borrower, the average daily short-selling over the period from January 2nd 
2005 to July 6th 2007 but excluding the event window (-60,+60). The daily abnormal short-
                                                 
23 While not central to our paper, one possible reason for hedge funds participating in ex-ante more risky loans is 
securing higher spreads on origination. We find that hedge funds indeed charge higher spread on their loans in 
comparison to propensity score matched loans extended purely by banks. In our sample, the average of All-In-
Spread Drawn (AISD) on a loan deal for hedge fund loans is 269.02 basis points in comparison to 162.8 basis points 
for propensity score matched bank loans (see section IV.A.1. for more details on propensity score matching). A 
difference that is significant at 1% level. 
24 We take the earlier date of the loan deal origination in Dealscan and the announcement date in the firm’s 
corresponding SEC filing.   
   
  
   
25
selling is the difference between the daily short-selling in the event window (-60, +60) and 
“normal” short-selling benchmark. We normalize the degree of short-selling by either 
outstanding shares (Short/SHROUT) or average daily volume prior to the event window 
(Short/Avol). Our results are robust to using either definition of abnormal short-selling.25  Next 
we present our results for the two alternative approaches to analyze the relative degree of short-
selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers the Propensity Score Matching model and 
Switching Regression with Endogenous Switching. 
V. A.1. Propensity Score Matching Model 
We first matched the borrowers in the hedge fund lender sample with those in the bank 
lender sample prior to loan origination using propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is based on 
logit model I in Table III since it has the largest sample size.26 Since short-selling data is 
available from January 1st 2005 to July 6th 2007 only we find that there are 70 firms from the 
hedge fund sample and 66 firms from the matched bank sample, of which, there are 55 PSM 
pairs.  Table IV summarizes the borrowing companies’ characteristics in each sample after PSM 
matching.  As expected since PSM initially matches borrowers with similar characteristics, there 
are no significant differences (at the 5% level or higher) between the hedge fund borrowers and 
PSM bank borrowers at the time of loan origination, see Table IV.  
<Insert Figure I> and <Insert Table V> 
Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, Panel A of Figure I shows that most of 
the abnormal equity short-selling activity in the hedge fund sample takes place prior to the deal 
announcement date whereas the abnormal short-selling for the equity of matched bank borrowers 
                                                 
25 For example our results are robust if we define normal short-selling as the mean short-selling on the same day and 
in the some stock exchange as the borrowing company. 
26 As a robustness test, we also used Model IV of Table III for PSM. Our results are robust except that the sample 
size is smaller. 
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is more evenly dispersed around the loan announcement date and the abnormal amount is 
generally non-positive. Figure 1, Panel B, shows that the cumulative abnormal short-selling 
activity of the two samples. As can be seen, the cumulative short-selling activity of hedge fund 
borrowing firms is positive and steeply rising prior the announcement date ((-10, -1) window) 
and appears to be marginally positive during the post-announcement (0, +10) window. By 
comparison, the cumulative abnormal short-selling activity in the bank lending sample is non-
positive and over both the pre- and post-announcement periods.27 
In Table V we present our results using the two alternative definitions for the abnormal 
short-selling behavior where in Panel A we present the abnormal short-selling results normalized 
by average trading volume (Short/Avol) while in Panel B short-selling is normalized by the 
outstanding number of a borrower’s shares (Short/SHROUT). Table V, Panel A.1 and B.1, 
shows that cumulative abnormal short-selling is positive and significant at 5% level for the hedge 
fund sample prior to the loan deal announcement date (over three windows  (-10,-1),  (-10,-6) 
and (-5,-1)) while it is positive but statistically insignificant post the loan deal announcement 
date (over three windows (0,+5), (+6,+10) and (0,+10)). On the other hand, and by comparison, 
the abnormal short-selling in the matched bank sample is negative and significant for the pre- 
and post-announcement periods in Panel A.2 while it is insignificant in Panel B.2 over the same 
pre- and post-announcement windows. Table V, Panels A.3 and B.3 show the difference in 
abnormal short-selling of the equity of hedge fund borrowers versus bank borrowers, for the 
relevant pre- and post-announcement windows. As can be seen, for all windows the difference is 
statistically and economically significant. In particular for window (-10, -1) the cumulative 
abnormal short-selling is 130.4% for the hedge fund sample (Panel A.1) while it is -47.0% for 
                                                 
27 Interestingly, the capital market reacts positively for bank loans where the cumulative abnormal return is 1.52% 
during (0, +5) window and it is significant at 5% while the market reacts negatively to announcement of the hedge 
fund loans the cumulative abnormal return is -1.29% during (0, +5) window and it is significant at 10%. 
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the matched bank lender sample. The difference is positive (183.1%) and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.28 Thus our results offer strong support Hypothesis 1, i.e, The equity of 
hedge fund borrowers is more likely to be short sold prior to public announcement of loan 
origination relative to that of bank borrowers. 
V. A.2. Switching Regression with Endogenous Switching(SRES) 
By using SRES, we are able to construct counterfactual cases that allows us to answer 
“what-if” type questions, e.g., for a loan extended by a hedge fund, what would the short-selling 
activity level for the same borrower’s equity have been if it had been extended by a bank? The 
results for the first and second stages of the SRES estimation are presented in Appendix B in 
Tables B.1 and B.2. In general, the results from the first stage in Table B.1, are consistent with 
the univariate tests and the logit results which support the view that hedge funds target the highly 
leveraged segment of the syndicated loan market. In addition, we find that the higher the value of 
the interaction of the high leverage loan dummy variable with the loans accumulated in the past 
five years variable (the instrumental variable in the SRES) the more likely it is for borrowers to 
borrow from hedge funds. In the second stage, Table B.2, to estimate consistent standard errors, 
we use a bootstrap procedure.29 As can be seen from Table B.2 the inverse Mills-Ratio is 
significant at the 10% level for the hedge fund borrower sample, while it is insignificant for the 
bank borrower sample. Moreover, the coefficient equality reveal that the difference between the 
two inverse Mills ratios is positive and significant at the 10% level. These results provide some 
support to the notion that unobservables and private information have some affect on the short-
selling activity in the hedge fund borrower sample. 
                                                 
28 As a robustness test for leakage of information prior deal announcement, we excluded all loans that are financing 
merger and acquisition deals, all of our results are still hold. 
29 We thank Bill Greene of New York University for his suggestion regarding correction of the error terms in the 
second stage of SRES.  
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Table VI compares the actual and hypothetically estimated abnormal short-selling over 
the (-10, -1) loan amendment announcement window by the two types of borrowing groups, 
Panels A.1 and B.1 for hedge fund borrowers and Panels A.2 and B.2 for bank borrowers. 
Consistent with the PSM tests, we find higher abnormal short-selling of hedge fund borrowers’ 
equity prior to loan origination. In particular, in Panel A.1, The mean actual abnormal short-
selling for the hedge fund borrowers’ equity is 127.7%, 163.1% higher than the hypothetical       
-35.4% amount estimated if banks had undertaken the same lending activity to the same 
borrowers. This difference is significant at the 1% level in Panel A.1 and Panel B.1. By contrast, 
Panel A.2 indicates that for bank borrowers, the actual abnormal short-selling by banks (-43.8%) 
is lower than the hypothetical amount of abnormal short-selling by hedge funds (92.7%) if they 
have made loans to the same borrowers. The difference is again significant at the 1% level in 
Panels A.2 and B.2. Thus, our SRES results also support Hypothesis (H1). 
<Insert Table VI> 
 
V. B. Potential Conflict of Interest Prior to Loan Amendments (H2) 
Next we look at short-selling activity prior to public announcements of loan amendments. 
If equity short-selling activities are driven by loan hedging motives then we should expect to see 
short-selling increasing from normal levels just after or immediately around the public 
announcement of an amended loan contract. On the other hand, if the abnormal short-selling 
activities are observed prior to such an announcement then it is more likely to be related to 
trading activity seeking to exploit private information gathered during the loan renegotiation 
process. In particular, we believe that the potential for generating private information, that will 
be useful in making short-selling decision, will be strongest around loan renegotiation or 
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amendment dates rather than loan origination dates since hedge funds have both the private 
knowledge and the ability to force such amendments given a firm’s financial weakness leading 
up to possible loan covenant violations. Our results are presented in Tables VII to X and Figures 
II to IV. First, Table VII and Figure II show our univariate results comparing abnormal short-
selling, prior to loan amendment announcements, for hedge fund borrowers and bank borrowers. 
In Table VIII we show the potential profit that a short seller could have made by trading on the 
knowledge of an impending loan amendment. Next, we show a comparison of short-selling 
results based on two sorting approaches: i). amendment outcomes: favorable and unfavorable in 
Table IX and Figure III and ii). changes in credit quality quintile ex-post, i.e. highest and lowest 
EDF change quintile, between the pre- and post-announcement periods, in Table X and Figure 
IV. 
V. B.1. Univariate results 
We first present our results for univariate tests that compare abnormal short-selling 
activities for hedge fund borrowers and bank borrowers around loan amendment dates in Table 
VII and in Figure II. From Figure III it can be seen that short-selling activity is abnormally 
higher in the days prior to an amendment announcement date (day 0) in the hedge fund sample, 
especially between days -5 to 0. For the bank sample, abnormal short-selling is negative over the 
entire pre-announcement window. Specifically, In Table VII, Panel A, the cumulative abnormal 
short-selling for the hedge fund sample is a positive and significant 28.4% for the (-5, -1) 
window while it is negative and significant for all windows for the bank sample in Panel B, with 
the difference between the cumulative short-selling for the hedge fund sample and the bank 
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sample being positive and significant for virtually all windows.30 Thus, the empirical findings 
above are consistent with a potential conflict of interest by hedge funds with their loan borrowers 
and are supportive of H2.  
<Insert Figure II> and <Insert Table VII> 
V. B.2. Short-selling Profits Around Loan Amendments  
A natural question to ask is how much profit could a short seller have made by trading on  
private knowledge of an impending loan amendment? To answer this question we construct a 
simple naïve strategy where we consider the daily actual average abnormal short-selling volume 
in the 10 days around the loan amendment announcement (i.e., -10, 0, +10). In Table VIII the 
first column called “shorting day” indicates the day of the abnormal short-selling relative to day 
zero (amendment announcement day). For each day, we allow short sellers to close their 
positions on the announcement date, or one day, two days and up to 30 days after the amendment 
announcement. We call these “short position closing days”.  Profit (in thousands of dollars) is 
defined as profitt = (Short Pricet-Askn)×Abnormal Short Volume, whereas Short Pricet refers to 
the weighted average short-selling price at shorting day t, Askn refers to the close ask price on the 
nth trading day after the announcement, and abnormal short volume refers to the abnormal 
number of shares being shorted on day t. The results in Panel A of Table VIII, show that the 
short sellers in the hedge fund sample could make economically significant profits if they closed 
their positions on day 0 or after. 31 For example the total abnormal short-selling in the hedge fund 
borrowers equity on day -10 would make abnormal profit of approximately $5.0 million, $5.4 
million and $5.6 million if it closed at its positions on day 0 (the amendment announcement 
                                                 
30 These results are robust if we exclude from our hedge fund sample all hedge funds that are affiliated with financial 
conglomerate financial firms. 
31 A similar trading strategy is also profitable for the hedge fund sample by the trading on the private information 
collected during the due diligence prior to new loan announcement. The table is available upon request. 
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date), day 1 after and day 2 after,  respectively. If we consider the actual short-selling volume 
rather than abnormal short-selling volume then total short-selling profits would also be even 
larger, i.e., on day -10 the total profits from actual short-selling the hedge fund borrowers equity 
is approximately $5.8 million if the position was closed on day 0.32 In comparison to the equity 
short sellers of the hedge fund borrowers, those for the bank borrowers would mostly generate 
losses following a similar strategy, see Panel B of Table VIII. This is also true if we use the level 
of short-selling volume. In sum, our results indicate that hedge fund short sellers could make 
economically significant profits as a result of exploiting information gathered in their syndicated 
lending activities prior to loan amendment announcements. 
<Insert Table VIII> 
IV. B.3. Loan Amendment Outcomes: Favorable versus Unfavorable 
In this section, we present short-selling results based on the outcome of the 
renegotiations.  As mentioned above, the outcome from renegotiations can result in tighter 
(unfavorable) or looser (favorable) contractual terms for the borrower, see Tirole (2006). 33  We 
define favorable term changes as a larger principal amount, lower interest rate or longer maturity 
for the amended loans. We define favorable loan amendments as those with at least one 
favorable contract term change, but with no unfavorable loan term changes, and the remainder of 
loan amendments as unfavorable renegotiations. Table IX and Figure III present the results. Of 
the 113 amendments in the hedge fund sample, there are 37 unfavorable amendments and 76 
favorable ones, while for the bank sample there are 137 unfavorable amendments and 126 
favorable ones. Figure III, Panel A, shows that the abnormal short-selling activities are 
significantly positive prior to the announcement of a loan amendment only for unfavorable 
                                                 
32 The table of the profitability of total short-selling activity around loan amendments is available at request. 
33 The lenders might offer a favorable amendment even when a borrower violates loan covenants to help the 
borrower to payoff the loan. 
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amendments in the hedge fund sample, while they are negative for the bank sample (Panel B). As 
can be seen for the hedge fund borrowers, in Panel A of Table IX, abnormal short-selling 
activities are positive and significant in all windows prior to an unfavorable amendment 
announcement (i.e. for windows (-10, -1), (-10, 0), (-10, -6), (-5, -1) and (-5, 0)) while they are 
either negative or insignificant for favorable amendments. By contrast, for the bank loan 
amendment sample (Panel B of Table IX), abnormal short-selling activity is negative for both 
unfavorable and favorable amendments. Panel C of Table IV shows the differences between 
short-selling activity prior to unfavorable amendment announcements for the hedge fund and 
bank samples. As can be seen, the differences in abnormal short-selling are positive and 
significant for all windows prior to an (unfavorable) amendment date.  
<Insert Figure III> and <Insert Table IX> 
V. B.4. Loan Amendments: Sorted Based on Changes in EDF Quintiles 
It can be argued that the potential for private information based short-selling profits are 
the highest when amendments are triggered by a borrower’s credit deterioration and technical 
default on a loan contract. Accordingly, we sort amendments based on the change in the 
expected default frequency (EDF), which is a measure of the probability of default, between the 
pre- and post-loan amendment announcement periods. We measure the change in EDF as the 
difference between the EDF estimated at the month end of the amendment announcement date 
month and the EDF estimated six months prior to the amendment date. We then present the 
results for the lowest EDF quintile (lowest credit deterioration) and the highest EDF quintile 
(highest credit deterioration) in Table X and Figure IV.   
<Insert Figure IV> and <Insert Table X> 
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Consistent with our prior results, only the highest credit quality deterioration quintile in 
the hedge fund sample (Panel A of Table X) shows positive and significant abnormal selling by 
hedge funds of borrowing firms equity prior to loan renegotiation/amendment announcements 
for all (-10, -1), (-10, 0), (-5, -1) and (-5, 0) windows, and it is significantly larger (Panel C of 
Table X) than the similar quintile in the bank lender sample. In summary, our tests in this section 
provide evidence consistent with hedge funds exploiting private informational advantages 
regarding a weakening of a borrower’s credit worthiness by trading a borrowing firm’s equity 
prior to a loan amendment announcement.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed potential conflicts of interests relating to hedge funds' 
increased involvement in the syndicated lending market. We find that hedge funds tend to make 
more loans to more risky borrowers. Importantly, we find that the equity of the hedge fund 
borrowers is more likely to be sold short prior to loan originations and amendment dates, in 
comparison to the equity of bank borrowers. These results are even stronger when a borrower’s 
loan amendment is unfavorable or the credit quality of the borrower is deteriorating. 
Interestingly, for hedge fund borrowers, we show that such short-selling can be profitable around 
both loan origination and loan amendments announcement dates. Our results raise important 
issues regarding the regulation of hedge funds and the separation of their syndicated lending and 
equity short-selling activities.  
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Table I 
 Distribution of Loan Sample by Year and Industry 
 
Panel A reports the number of loans (at deal level) by lender category for each year from 1995 to 2008 
(1st quarter). The Hedge Fund Borrower sample includes all loan deals with at least one lender defined as 
a hedge fund or as a hedge fund management company. The Other Institutional Borrower sample includes 
all loan deals with an Institutional Borrower that is not identified as a hedge fund. The Bank Borrower 
sample covers all loan deals that are made by a lender or a syndicate of lenders where all lenders are 
commercial banks. Panel B reports the number of borrowers in each lender category by year. Panel C 
summarizes the number of borrowers by the Fama and French’s industry classification. Specifically, we 
categorize borrower’s 4-digit SIC codes into 30 major industry classes as defined by Fama and French.  
 
Panel A: Number of Deals in Each Category by Year 
 Hedge Fund Borrower Sample  
Other Institutional 
Borrower Sample  
Bank 
Borrower Sample 
Year N Pct (%)  N Pct (%)  N Pct (%) 
1995 24 5.15  4 0.86  438 93.99 
1996 52 6.52  8 1.00  737 92.47 
1997 73 8.45  15 1.74  776 89.81 
1998 42 5.59  26 3.46  684 90.96 
1999 61 8.65  27 3.83  617 87.52 
2000 42 6.49  24 3.71  581 89.80 
2001 33 5.66  18 3.09  532 91.25 
2002 53 7.89  29 4.32  590 87.80 
2003 68 13.15  24 4.64  425 82.21 
2004 69 13.61  24 4.73  414 81.66 
2005 56 12.10  25 5.40  382 82.51 
2006 46 10.72  49 11.42  334 77.86 
2007 40 12.20  39 11.89  249 75.91 
2008(1st Q) 1 1.28  4 5.13  73 93.59 
All 660 8.45  316 4.05  6,832 87.50 
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Panel B: Number of unique Borrower’s in Each Category by Year 
 Hedge Fund  Borrower Sample  
Other Institutional 
Borrower Sample  
Bank  
Borrower Sample 
Year N Pct (%)  N Pct (%)  N Pct (%) 
1995 24 5.21  4 0.87  433 93.93 
1996 52 6.65  8 1.02  722 92.33 
1997 72 8.56  14 1.66  755 89.77 
1998 42 5.74  24 3.28  666 90.98 
1999 61 8.76  27 3.88  608 87.36 
2000 42 6.59  24 3.77  571 89.64 
2001 33 5.82  18 3.17  516 91.01 
2002 53 8.05  27 4.10  578 87.84 
2003 66 13.12  22 4.37  415 82.50 
2004 69 13.80  24 4.80  407 81.40 
2005 55 12.01  24 5.24  379 82.75 
2006 45 10.71  46 10.95  329 78.33 
2007 40 12.31  38 11.69  247 76.00 
2008 (1st Q) 1 1.28  4 5.13  73 93.59 
All 655 8.55  304 3.97  6,699 87.48 
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Panel C: Industry Classification of Borrowers in Each Category 
  Hedge Fund  Borrower Sample  
Other Institutional 
Borrower Sample  
Bank  
Borrower Sample 
Industry 
Categories Industry Descriptions N Pct (%)  N Pct (%)  N Pct (%) 
1 Food Products 12 1.86  7 2.36  133 2.02 
2 Beer & Liquor 3 0.47  . .  24 0.36 
3 Tobacco Products 1 0.16  1 0.34  5 0.08 
4 Recreation 37 5.74  13 4.38  146 2.21 
5 Printing and Publishing 4 0.62  3 1.01  74 1.12 
6 Consumer Goods 9 1.40  10 3.37  108 1.64 
7 Apparel 6 0.93  4 1.35  117 1.77 
8 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products 41 6.36  27 9.09  463 7.02 
9 Chemicals 18 2.79  1 0.34  78 1.18 
10 Textiles 4 0.62  6 2.02  48 0.73 
11 Construction and Construction Materials 15 2.33  10 3.37  215 3.26 
12 Steel Works Etc 14 2.17  9 3.03  119 1.80 
13 Fabricated Products and Machinery 26 4.03  8 2.69  250 3.79 
14 Electrical Equipment 6 0.93  9 3.03  79 1.20 
15 Automobiles and Trucks 15 2.33  4 1.35  86 1.30 
16 Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment 3 0.47  . .  51 0.77 
17 Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and Industrial Metal Mining 2 0.31  . .  56 0.85 
18 Coal 5 0.78  1 0.34  5 0.08 
19 Petroleum and Natural Gas 37 5.74  10 3.37  312 4.73 
20 Utilities 11 1.71  5 1.68  217 3.29 
21 Communication 68 10.54  11 3.70  163 2.47 
22 Personal and Business Services 81 12.56  41 13.8  857 13.00 
23 Business Equipment 39 6.05  29 9.76  722 10.95 
24 Business Supplies and Shipping Containers 25 3.88  4 1.35  103 1.56 
25 Transportation 20 3.10  10 3.37  200 3.03 
26 Wholesale 22 3.41  11 3.70  318 4.82 
27 Retail 28 4.34  20 6.73  493 7.48 
28 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 17 2.64  12 4.04  129 1.96 
29 Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 66 10.23  28 9.43  986 14.96 
30 Everything Else 10 1.55  3 1.01  36 0.55 
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Table II 
 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A.1 of Table II summarizes firm characteristics of borrowers across different lender 
categories. The statistics are reported at the deal level. All operating performance variables are 
measured with COMPUSTAT data as of the fiscal year-end at least 3 months prior to the loan 
origination over the period 1995 to 2008 (1st quarter). Firm Size refers to the natural logarithm of 
total assets (in million dollars). For manufacturing companies, Altman’s Z score is defined as 
1.2×(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3×(EBIT/Total 
Assets) + 0.6×(Mkt Value of Equity/ Book Value of Total Liabilities) + 1.0×Sales/Total Assets. 
For non-manufacturing companies, Z-score is defined as 6.56×(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 
3.26×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 6.72×(EBIT/Total Assets) + 1.05×(Mkt Value of 
Equity/ Book Value of Total Liabilities). The Cash/assets ratio refers to the ratio of cash and 
equivalents to total assets. The Net worth/assets ratio is defined as net worth divided by total 
assets. The EBIT/assets ratio is defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
Book to Market refers to the book-to-market ratio of equity. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets. Leverage is measured as the sum of long-term debt 
plus current liabilities divided by total assets. Sales Growth refers to the average rate of sales 
growth over the 3 years prior to loan origination date. Profit margin is defined as the ratio of 
earnings to sales. The interest coverage ratio is measured as gross earnings divided by the sum of 
total interest expense and capitalized interest. Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA) refers to the ratio of net income to equity and the ratio of net income to assets 
respectively. Expected Default Frequency (EDF) refers to the estimated probability of default 
measured 3 months prior to loan origination based on Bharath and Shumway’s method (2008). 
Beta and RMSE is the estimated slope coefficient and root mean squared error based on the 
market model, calculated over the window (-312, -61) with respect to the loan origination date. 
Run-up is the holding period return over the same estimation window (-312, -61). Institutional 
ownership is obtained from Thompson form 13F and it is the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors, measured as the average of last 4 quarters at least 3 month prior to loan 
origination date. Panel A.2 summarizes loan characteristics.  Investment Grade indicates whether 
the borrower was at investment grade at the loan close day (equal to 1 if the S&P senior long-
term debt was rated at “BBB” or higher and 0 for the rest). Covenant equals to 1 if at least one 
facility of a loan has a covenant, and equals to 0 for the rest. Similarly, Secured is the indicator 
whether a loan deal is secured or not (equal to 1 if at least one facility is secured, and 0 for the 
rest). Panel A.3 summarizes the instrument variable: the interaction of HighLever and Cum. 
Loan (HighLever×Cum), where HighLever refers to the Highly Leveraged Loan indicator 
variable (1 for Highly Leveraged Loan and 0 otherwise) and Cum. Loan refers to the natural 
logarithm of the cumulative amount of loans a company has borrowed (in million dollars) within 
the past five years before the current loan deal. We report t-statistics for mean differences and 
Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test for differences in distribution between the unmatched samples in Panel 
B. Panel C presents the correlations between the explanatory variables. All variables except 
Expected Default Freq. are winsorized at the 2 and 98 percentiles, *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Hedge Fund  Borrower Sample  
Other Institutional  
Borrower Sample  
Bank  
Borrower Sample 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Panel A.1. Borrower Characteristics 
Size (log assets) 616 6.992 6.868  295 5.609 5.501  6,490 5.652 5.539 
Altmans Z 441 3.366 2.120  253 4.134 2.444  4,785 5.138 3.556 
Expected Default Freq. 369 0.116 1.2E-5  200 0.094 1.1E-5  4,436 0.086 8.8E-6 
Cash/Assets 616 0.085 0.044  295 0.106 0.050  6,489 0.117 0.057 
Interest Coverage Ratio 541 11.281 1.993  251 10.152 2.695  5,476 13.468 3.572 
Leverage 613 0.385 0.377  294 0.321 0.303  6,455 0.254 0.220 
NetWorth/Assets 615 0.314 0.327  295 0.398 0.397  6,473 0.448 0.457 
Book-to-market 507 0.532 0.425  269 0.595 0.507  5,668 0.624 0.511 
Tobins q 458 1.611 1.346  257 1.702 1.387  5,351 1.773 1.374 
EBIT/Assets 613 0.055 0.064  293 0.043 0.063  6,455 0.046 0.072 
Profit Margin 611 -0.010 0.028  293 -0.010 0.024  6,437 -0.003 0.038 
ROE 613 0.058 0.084  293 0.031 0.076  6,446 0.047 0.096 
ROA 613 0.003 0.021  293 0.003 0.025  6,460 0.005 0.034 
Sale Growth 570 0.242 0.089  289 0.225 0.090  6,032 0.266 0.123 
Beta 477 1.129 1.012  247 1.040 0.965  5,674 1.064 0.947 
RMSE 477 0.032 0.027  247 0.035 0.027  5,674 0.035 0.030 
Runup 477 0.201 0.152  247 0.192 0.097  5,674 0.129 0.062 
Institutional Ownership 417 0.503 0.532  239 0.462 0.455  5,210 0.403 0.374 
 
Panel A.2. Loan Characteristics 
 
Hedge Fund  
Borrower Sample  
Other Institutional  
Borrower Sample  
Bank  
Borrower Sample 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Investment Grade 660 0.082 0  316 0.019 0  6,832 0.113 0 
Covenant 660 0.759 1  316 0.753 1  6,832 0.731 1 
Secured 660 0.746 1  316 0.813 1  6,832 0.579 1 
            
Panel A.3. Instrument Variable 
HighLever×Cum. Loan 660 1.502 0  316 1.422 0  6,832 0.661 0 
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Panel B: Mean differences between samples: t-statistics, and Wilcoxon’s Z-statistics 
 Hedge Fund – Other Institution   Hedge Fund – Bank   Other Institution – Bank 
Panel B.1: Firm’s characteristics 
 Mean Diff t-value  Wil.    Mean Diff t-value  Wil.    Mean Diff t-value  Wil.  
Size (log assets) 1.383 12.06 *** 11.50 ***   1.340 17.94 *** 16.98 ***   -0.044 -0.46  0.13  
Altmans Z -0.768 -2.00 ** -2.12 **   -1.771 -8.19 *** -9.57 ***   -1.004 -3.00 *** -5.00 *** 
Expected Default Freq. 0.022 1.06  0.54    0.030 2.17 ** 2.19 **   0.008 0.50  0.90  
Cash/Assets -0.021 -2.30 ** -1.13    -0.032 -6.77 *** -4.01 ***   -0.011 -1.38  -1.40  
Interest Coverage Ratio 1.129 0.50  -0.47    -2.187 -1.56  -4.99 ***   -3.316 -1.76 * -2.68 *** 
Leverage 0.064 3.68 *** 3.56 ***   0.131 12.29 *** 12.47 ***   0.068 4.78 *** 4.82 *** 
NetWorth/Assets -0.084 -4.38 *** -4.19 ***   -0.134 -11.65 *** -11.54 ***   -0.050 -3.15 *** -3.13 *** 
Book-to-market -0.063 -1.53  -1.90 *   -0.092 -3.57 *** -4.66 ***   -0.029 -0.85  -1.13  
Tobins q -0.091 -1.21  -0.55    -0.162 -3.73 *** -1.68 *   -0.071 -1.09  -0.60  
EBIT/Assets 0.012 1.37  0.65    0.009 1.91 * -1.12    -0.002 -0.32  -1.45  
Profit Margin -3.6E-04 -0.03  0.82    -0.007 -0.85  -3.25 ***   -0.007 -0.64  -3.49 *** 
ROE 0.027 0.92  0.78    0.011 0.67  -1.01    -0.016 -0.63  -1.57  
ROA 2.7E-04 0.04  -0.60    -0.002 -0.44  -4.40 ***   -0.002 -0.35  -2.19 ** 
Sale Growth 0.016 0.50  0.23    -0.025 -1.24  -3.63 ***   -0.041 -1.52  -2.96 *** 
Beta 0.089 1.66 * 1.44    0.065 1.96 * 2.46 **   -0.024 -0.54  0.08  
RMSE -0.002 -1.71 * -2.05 **   -0.003 -2.85 *** -2.59 ***   0.000 -0.01  0.37  
Runup 0.009 0.20  0.40    0.072 2.57 ** 2.76 ***   0.062 1.67 * 1.51  
Institutional Ownership 0.041 1.71 * 1.72 *   0.101 6.87 *** 6.86 ***   0.060 3.06 *** 3.03 *** 
 
 
 
Panel B.2: Loan Characteristics 
 Hedge Fund – Other Institution  Hedge Fund – Bank  Other Institution – Bank 
 Mean Diff t-value  Wil.   Mean Diff t-value  Wil.   Mean Diff t-value  Wil.  
Investment Grade 0.063 4.78 *** 3.82 ***  -0.031 -2.76 *** -2.45 **  -0.094 -10.96 *** -5.25 *** 
Covenant 0.006 0.20  0.20   0.028 1.58  1.54   0.022 0.87  0.85  
Secured -0.068 -2.44 ** -2.35 **  0.166 9.25 *** 8.31 ***  0.234 10.29 *** 8.27 *** 
                  
Panel B.3: Instrument Variable 
HighLever×Cum. Loan 0.080 0.51  0.17   0.842 8.73 *** 9.87 ***  0.762 6.05 *** 7.45 *** 
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 Panel C: Correlations between  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Size (log assets) 1.00                  
2 Altmans Z -0.10 1.00                 
3 Expected Default Freq. -0.07 -0.23 1.00                
4 Cash/Assets -0.21 0.46 -0.09 1.00               
5 Interest Coverage Ratio 0.03 0.49 -0.16 0.19 1.00              
6 Leverage 0.09 -0.53 0.28 -0.37 -0.36 1.00             
7 NetWorth/Assets -0.20 0.62 -0.24 0.35 0.33 -0.70 1.00            
8 Book-to-market -0.04 -0.27 0.25 -0.20 -0.15 0.00 0.12 1.00           
9 Tobins q -0.14 0.66 -0.17 0.43 0.29 -0.27 0.24 -0.60 1.00          
10 EBIT/Assets 0.19 0.32 -0.30 -0.18 0.43 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.09 1.00         
11 Profit Margin 0.25 0.17 -0.23 -0.26 0.32 -0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.79 1.00        
12 ROE 0.11 0.18 -0.24 -0.09 0.19 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 0.07 0.46 0.39 1.00       
13 ROA 0.21 0.32 -0.32 -0.17 0.43 -0.13 0.20 -0.04 0.05 0.97 0.83 0.46 1.00      
14 Sale Growth -0.15 0.17 0.06 0.20 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.14 0.23 -0.17 -0.25 -0.11 -0.17 1.00     
15 Beta -0.03 0.18 0.06 0.30 0.06 -0.14 0.13 -0.20 0.29 -0.16 -0.23 -0.12 -0.16 0.21 1.00    
16 RMSE -0.55 -0.10 0.51 0.16 -0.16 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.02 -0.45 -0.45 -0.33 -0.48 0.19 0.28 1.00   
17 Runup 0.01 0.10 -0.38 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.14 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.20 -0.05 0.00 -0.18 1.00  
18 Institutional Ownership 0.45 0.14 -0.22 0.03 0.14 -0.08 0.10 -0.13 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.18 -0.09 0.16 -0.40 0.02 1.00 
19 Investment Grade 0.47 -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.30 0.01 0.19 
20 Covenant -0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.03 
21 Secured -0.44 -0.09 0.18 0.10 -0.14 0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.25 -0.24 -0.14 -0.25 0.13 0.10 0.41 -0.07 -0.21 
22 HighLever×Cum. Loan -0.04 -0.12 0.09 -0.16 -0.08 0.27 -0.15 0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 
 
 
  19 20 21 22 
19 Investment Grade 1.00    
20 Covenant -0.11 1.00   
21 Secured -0.35 0.31 1.00  
22 HighLever×Cum. Loan -0.10 0.04 0.08 1.00 
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Table III 
 Logit Regressions on the Probability of Borrowing from Hedge Funds 
This Table reports our logit regression results. The dependent variable in these regressions takes the value of 1 if there is at least one 
Hedge Fund Borrower in a given loan deal, otherwise it takes the value of 0 if all lenders are commercial banks. This analysis is based 
on loan deals during the sample period 1995 to 2008 (1st quarter). Elasticity (Elast.) was calculated as d(lnF)/d(lnx), where d is the 
first derivative, ln(F) is the natural logarithm of the density function and  ln(x) is the natural logarithm of the explanatory variable and 
is evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. Heteroskedasticity corrected robust t-statistics (t-stats) are reported in 
all specifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
  Regression I   Regression II   Regression III   Regression IV 
  Coef.   t-stats. Elast.   Coef.   t-stats. Elast.   Coef.   t-stats. Elast.   Coef.   t-stats. Elast. 
Size (log assets) 0.34 *** 8.85 1.955  0.375 *** 8.64 2.169  0.374 *** 8.72 2.151  0.385 *** 7.22 2.176 
Expected default frequency ----   ---- ----  ----   ---- ----  0.752 ** 2.04 0.054  0.771 ** 2.04 0.057 
Cash/assets -0.341  -0.57 -0.037  -0.249  -0.38 -0.027  -3.516 *** -4.18 -0.347  -2.612 *** -2.75 -0.264 
Leverage 2.678 *** 9.71 0.62  2.865 *** 9.16 0.665  ----  ---- ----  ----  ---- ---- 
Book-to-market -0.127  -0.94 -0.075  0.048  0.33 0.028  -0.426 ** -2.51 -0.254  ----  ---- ---- 
Tobin’s q ----  ---- ----  ----  ---- ----  ----  ---- ----  -0.166  -1.63 -0.275 
EBIT/assets 1.171 * 1.84 0.064  0.932  1.4 0.051  0.62  0.9 0.034  1.057  1.17 0.058 
Sale growth 0.055  0.3 0.013  0.022  0.11 0.005  0.26  1.42 0.061  0.166  0.83 0.04 
Beta -0.062  -0.62 -0.063  -0.164  -1.48 -0.167  -0.028  -0.26 -0.028  0.018  0.14 0.018 
RMSE 27.406 *** 5.47 0.87  21.866 *** 3.93 0.696  32.974 *** 5.11 1.067  25.021 *** 3.39 0.829 
Run-up 0.372 *** 3.28 0.051  0.328 *** 2.81 0.045  0.54 *** 4.31 0.072  0.472 *** 3.42 0.061 
Institutional ownership 1.383 *** 5.36 0.568  1.43 *** 5.37 0.593  1.724 *** 5.77 0.7  1.65 *** 4.89 0.672 
Year Effect Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes    
Industry Effect No     Yes     No     Yes    
Observations 5071     4983     4073     3689    
Chi Square 284.83     368.78     206.79     256.89    
Pseudo R-square 0.129         0.176         0.116         0.15       
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Table IV 
Firm Characteristics after Propensity Score Matching 
 
This table reports the characteristics of the propensity score matched hedge fund borrowers and 
bank borrowers sample during the sample period from 1995 to 2008 (1st quarter).  We conduct 
propensity score matching (PSM) based on regression I in Table III using the nearest 
neighborhood within a 0.8 caliper. After PSM, we have 342 observations in each of the treatment 
(hedge fund borrowers) and the matching sample (bank borrowers). Table IV summarizes the 
borrowing companies’ characteristics in each sample after matching and prior loan origination 
date.  
 
 Treatment Sample (Hedge Fund Borrower)   
Matching Sample 
(Bank Borrower)   
Paired Mean Diff. Test 
(Hedge Fund -Bank) 
 N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Diff. 
 t-stats. 
Size (log assets) 342 7.033 6.894   342 7.085 6.962   342 -0.052  -0.46 
Altmans Z 296 3.584 2.323   259 4.464 3.145   231 -0.622 * -1.76 
Expected Default Freq. 275 0.096 5.E-06   265 0.101 1.E-06   218 -0.006  -0.25 
Cash/Assets 342 0.087 0.047   342 0.092 0.051   342 -0.005  -0.66 
Interest Coverage Ratio 302 13.255 2.593   303 12.943 3.021   270 -0.354  -0.15 
Leverage 342 0.365 0.359   342 0.359 0.337   342 0.006  0.48 
NetWorth/Assets 342 0.353 0.367   342 0.373 0.366   342 -0.020  -1.41 
Book-to-market 342 0.555 0.450   342 0.571 0.508   342 -0.015  -0.40 
Tobins q 313 1.650 1.375   317 1.722 1.310   292 -0.101  -1.32 
EBIT/Assets 342 0.066 0.071   342 0.063 0.069   342 0.003  0.34 
Profit Margin 340 0.015 0.038   342 0.039 0.059   340 -0.026 * -1.82 
ROE 342 0.058 0.088   341 0.084 0.109   341 -0.026  -1.07 
ROA 342 0.016 0.029   342 0.021 0.030   342 -0.005  -0.72 
Sale Growth 342 0.233 0.095   342 0.246 0.118   342 -0.014  -0.44 
Beta 342 1.095 0.998   342 1.150 1.036   342 -0.055  -1.09 
RMSE 342 0.030 0.026   342 0.031 0.025   342 -4.E-04  -0.33 
Runup 342 0.200 0.146   342 0.200 0.125   342 8.E-05  0.00 
Institutional Ownership 342 0.541 0.558   342 0.546 0.579   342 -0.005  -0.28 
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Table V 
 Propensity Score Match Adjusted Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Origination  
This table reports the cumulative abnormal short-selling activity around the loan origination date during the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 
2007. We use the propensity score matching methodology to construct a matched sample of bank borrower (matched sample) for every hedge fund 
borrower (treatment sample), based on regression I in Table III with caliper 0.8. After PSM, there are 70 firms from the hedge fund sample and 66 
firms from the matched bank sample. Of which, there are 55 PSM pairs. In Panel A, abnormal Short-sellings is calculated over the various windows 
for the hedge fund borrower sample and matched bank borrower sample. We define abnormal short selling by adjusting the short selling activities 
around the loan origination date by normal short selling activities outside the event window (-120, -61).  We define our “normal” short selling 
benchmark for any borrower, the average daily short selling over the period from January 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007 but excluding event period(s) (-
60,+60). The daily abnormal short selling is the difference between the actual daily short selling in the event window (-60, +60) and “normal” short 
selling benchmark. We normalize the degree of short selling by either outstanding shares (Short/SHROUT) or average daily volume prior the event 
window (Short/Avol). Our results are robust to using either definition of abnormal short selling. We winsorize all the abnormal short-selling 
measures at 2% and 98% percentile by each sample and each day. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Short/Avol  
Panel A.1: Treatment Sample (Hedge Fund borrowers ) 
 (-10,0)  (-10,-6)  (-5,0)  (-10,-1)  (-5,-1)  (0,+5)  (+6,+10)  (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol 1.383**  0.574**  0.817**  1.304**  0.738**  0.165  0.121  0.271 
t-statistics 2.37  2.18  2.34  2.27  2.18  1.19  0.86  1.13 
Num of Observations 70  69  70  70  70  64  56  64 
            
Panel A.2: Matched Sample (Bank borrowers) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.555**  -0.241*  -0.314**  -0.470**  -0.229*  -0.220  -0.340***  -0.560** 
t-statistics -2.21  -1.94  -2.29  -2.01  -1.88  -1.48  -3.15  -2.33 
Num of Observations 66  66  66  66  66  66  66  66 
            
Panel A..3: Paired Mean Difference Test (Hedge Fund – Bank) 
Mean difference (A – B) 2.005***  0.899**  1.118***  1.831**  0.943**  0.494*  0.446**  0.942** 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 2.68  2.42  2.72  2.51  2.40  1.99  2.40  2.36 
Num of Observations 55  54  55  55  55  49  44  49 
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Panel B: Univariate Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Short/SHROUT (%) 
Panel B.1: Treatment Sample (Hedge Fund borrowers) 
 (-10,0)  (-10,-6)  (-5,0)  (-10,-1)  (-5,-1)  (0,+5)  (+6,+10)  (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/SHROUT 0. 902**  0.316**  0. 591**  0. 848**  0. 537**  0.095  0.047  0.136 
t-statistics 2.52  2.22  2.50  2.44  2.37  1.03  0.54  0.92 
Num of Observations 71  70  71  71  71  65  57  65 
            
Panel B.2: Matched Sample (Bank borrowers) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/SHROUT -0.148  -0.048  -0.101  -0.116  -0.068  -0.061  -0.127**  -0.188 
t-statistics -1.11  -0.67  -1.33  -0.95  -1.05  -0.76  -2.36  -1.50 
Num of Observations 67  67  67  67  67  67  67  67 
            
Panel B..3: Paired Mean Difference Test (Hedge Fund – Bank) 
Mean difference (A – B) 1.201***  0. 418**  0.788***  1.100**  0.686**  0.250  0.215*  0.448** 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 57  56  57  57  57  51  46  51 
Num of Observations 2.64  2.05  2.80  2.51  2.59  1.67  2.00  2.03 
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Table VI 
 Switching Simultaneous Equations Model results, Actual v.s. Hypothetical Abnormal Short Selling 
In this Table we report the actual and hypothetical cumulative abnormal Short/Avol ratios over window (-10, -1) of the Hedge Fund 
Borrower sample and bank sample during the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007. In panel A we report the actual and 
hypothetical abnormal short selling for the Hedge Fund Borrower sample. The hypothetical refers to the model estimated abnormal 
short selling if the companies borrowed from Bank Borrowers. Similarly, in panel B we report the actual and hypothetical abnormal 
short selling for the Bank Borrower sample. In panel B we conduct similar analysis but using Cumulative Abnormal Short/SHROUT 
(in percentage) as the dependent variables.   
 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Short/Avol  over window (-10, -1) 
Panel A.1 : Hedge Fund Borrower 
Sample  Panel A.2: Bank Borrower Sample 
Actual value 1.277   Actual value -0.438  
Hypothetical value -0.354   Hypothetical value 0.927  
Actual-Hypothetical 1.631 ***  Actual-Hypothetical -1.365 *** 
Observations 71   Observations 612  
t-statistics 2.92   t-statistics -12.21  
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Short/SHROUT  over window (-10, -1) (%) 
Panel B.1 : Hedge Fund Borrower 
Sample  Panel B.2: Bank Borrower Sample 
Actual value 6.680   Actual value 0.501  
Hypothetical value 0.607   Hypothetical value 6.154  
Actual-Hypothetical 6.073 ***  Actual-Hypothetical -5.654 *** 
Observations 72   Observations 613  
t-statistics 15.75   t-statistics -75.38  
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Table VII 
 Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
In this Table we report abnormal shorting activity around the announcement day of loan amendments for both the hedge fund and the 
bank loan borrower samples during the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007. We present the results over various event 
windows. We obtain our loan amendment sample from two sources: (i) loan amendments as defined by the DealScan database, (ii) 
hand-collecting amendments from borrower filings of forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K with the SEC (mentioned in section 3.C.). From 
these forms we also hand-collect information including the announcement date of the loan amendment (day 0), changes in loan size, 
maturity and interest rate. We report t-statistics for the differences in means between the hedge fund and the bank sample. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 Panel A: Hedge Fund Borrower Sample 
Windows (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol 0.270 -0.013 0.283** 0.212 0.284* 0.083 -0.037 0.047 
t-statistics 1.43 -0.15 2.08 1.17 1.90 0.93 -0.45 0.31 
Num of Observations 113 113 113 113 113 107 105 107 
         
 Panel B: Bank Borrower Sample  
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.357** -0.178** -0.179** -0.331** -0.174* -0.187** -0.123* -0.309** 
t-statistics -2.31 -2.24 -2.05 -2.30 -1.84 -2.19 -1.91 -2.27 
Num of Observations 263 262 263 263 263 263 259 263 
         
 Panel C: Mean Difference Test (Hedge Fund – Bank) 
Mean difference (A – B) 0.627** 0.165 0.462*** 0.542** 0.457** 0.270** 0.086 0.355* 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 2.57 1.43 2.86 2.35 2.59 2.19 0.83 1.76 
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Table VIII: Profitability of Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
This Table summarizes the profits (in thousand of dollars) that short seller can make around loan amendment announcement dates based on 
different strategies during the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007. Shorting Day refers to the day on which short sellers start their 
shorting position and day 0 is defined as the amendment announcement date, or the next trading day if the announcement date is not a trading day. 
Short Position Closing Day refers to how many days after the amendment announcement short sellers fully recover their shorting position by 
purchasing back the securities they short sold before. Closing Day0 means that short sellers will close all their shorting position on the 
announcement day of the loan amendment. Profit (in thousands of dollars) is defined as profitt = (Short Pricet-Askn)×Abnormal Short Volume, 
whereas Short Pricet refers to the weighted average short selling price at shorting day t, Askn refers to the close ask price on the nth trading day after 
the announcement, and abnormal short volume refers to the abnormal number of shares being shorted on day t. Panel A and Panel B reports the 
profits of abnormal short selling activity in the hedge fund sample and the bank sample, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Hedge Fund borrowers Sample 
   Short Position Closing Day Post Announcement 
Shorting Day N 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 30 
-10 104 5,001 5,382 5,559 5,388 4,508 4,013 3,150 2,134 1,616 1,783 526 10 2,492 -1,198 
-9 104 2,655 3,390 2,372 5,198 4,799 4,143 3,438 1,952 1,299 578 194 1,269 2,324 -6,808 
-8 103 6,977 7,534 6,527 5,837 6,251 6,365 7,180 7,042 7,588 6,932 9,572 7,240 9,243 3,134 
-7 105 -156 403 184 1,180 1,342 732 43 -331 -1,143 -729 -852 -1,538 -1,069 -105 
-6 105 4,153 5,395 5,107 5,495 4,803 4,044 3,073 2,689 1,281 1,301 1,169 -279 2,884 -575 
-5 106 3,777 4,793 4,983 6,052 5,989 4,819 3,096 2,600 2,480 3,168 2,047 1,888 4,194 5,433 
-4 105 807 1,488 2,756 3,119 2,283 1,614 -246 -261 -298 867 -968 -1,862 -1,721 -252 
-3 105 4,090 4,763 5,471 5,221 4,396 3,968 1,869 1,868 2,113 2,650 380 143 2,838 2,939 
-2 106 4,463 5,463 4,902 5,436 6,012 6,795 6,103 6,301 7,634 7,610 9,769 9,120 10,633 8,699 
-1 106 562 207 444 -264 -1,107 -2,713 -2,895 -3,485 -2,044 -588 -1,735 -5,719 2,212 6,572 
sum(-10,-1)  32,328 38,818 38,304 42,662 39,274 33,780 24,810 20,510 20,527 23,573 20,101 10,273 34,028 17,838 
0 106 --- 232 -212 939 611 31 -726 -1,081 -348 268 -856 -471 1,554 2,388 
1 104 --- --- 901 1,449 975 -343 -1,278 -1,047 -869 -861 -2,086 -3,282 92 1,885 
2 105 --- --- --- 1,284 1,259 350 -675 -1,078 -757 -419 -1,333 -1,170 161 3,284 
3 104 --- --- --- --- -1,371 -2,059 -2,884 -3,678 -4,020 -4,161 -6,081 -6,979 -4,726 -6,562 
4 105 --- --- --- --- --- -887 -1,919 -2,184 -2,738 -2,492 -4,919 -5,012 -3,367 -1,962 
5 103 --- --- --- --- --- --- -2,091 -2,123 -1,873 -784 -3,702 -4,538 -5,552 817 
6 104 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 310 814 -313 1,693 -498 -229 -1,553 
7 103 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 595 52 2,168 -722 183 -1,975 
8 104 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -846 -703 -3,133 -3,927 -3,323 
9 103 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1,265 -2,310 -1,165 2,197 
10 103 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -873 -596 631 
Sum(0,+1)   232 689 3,672 1,475 -2,908 -9,573 -10,882 -9,196 -9,556 -17,087 -28,989 -17,572 -4,174 
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 Panel B: Bank Borrower Sample 
   Short Position Closing Day Post Announcement 
Shorting 
Day N 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 30 
-10 258 6,599 6,733 8,826 8,914 10,184 8,080 7,049 7,406 8,767 9,387 7,749 7,794 6,540 9,575 
-9 256 -4,186 -4,678 -4,145 -5,379 -3,539 -5,707 -6,973 -6,289 -8,973 -11,040 -12,438 -17,202 -18,379 -15,225 
-8 259 -277 -1,614 -1,313 -1,579 -2,393 -3,624 -3,814 -3,149 -4,979 -4,112 -7,053 -6,535 -8,862 -9,771 
-7 258 5,185 4,182 4,898 4,565 3,557 1,552 1,796 2,801 2,217 2,338 -91 -3,706 -5,338 -1,079 
-6 257 -3,751 -4,211 -2,517 -1,876 886 -991 -1,071 -2,339 -3,593 -1,907 -6,267 -5,672 -6,847 -4,750 
-5 257 -1,481 -2,489 -1,057 702 3,073 1,560 345 -2,009 -4,882 -1,360 -6,413 -2,936 828 4,680 
-4 255 -1,204 -4,419 -4,391 -3,288 -643 -2,514 -2,746 -7,588 -9,870 -8,185 -15,157 -10,264 -8,456 -4,417 
-3 259 -1,844 -4,206 -6,183 -4,465 -1,822 -3,164 -2,172 -5,480 -7,240 -6,409 -10,879 -12,241 -12,593 -16,912 
-2 260 -590 -4,283 -5,163 -6,234 -4,316 -4,800 -4,901 -7,267 -11,287 -11,953 -15,760 -17,711 -15,818 -16,022 
-1 261 222 -949 -1,481 -1,785 47 -1,794 -1,811 -3,907 -4,454 -4,788 -8,293 -9,498 -9,911 -10,721 
sum(-10,-
1)  -1,328 -15,933 -12,526 -10,426 5,032 -11,403 -14,297 -27,822 -44,295 -38,030 -74,602 -77,970 -78,837 -64,644 
0 259 --- -944 1,604 74 1,219 -901 396 933 -1,461 -2,721 -5,143 -3,330 -5,065 -10,786 
1 262 --- --- -460 -618 1,705 -617 775 2,357 -2,853 -3,383 -6,619 -7,125 -6,716 -7,649 
2 255 --- --- --- 535 2,407 1,264 -313 732 -4,167 -3,757 -5,027 -8,243 -7,232 -5,660 
3 256 --- --- --- --- 1,246 1,742 1,962 3,403 -323 -3 -4,347 -131 -4,832 2,986 
4 255 --- --- --- --- --- -1,744 -1,160 -3,039 -6,990 -3,257 -6,519 -11,719 -20,459 -18,254 
5 257 --- --- --- --- --- --- -1,706 -3,297 -4,781 -4,264 -10,522 -10,487 -13,871 -10,499 
6 257 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1,818 -4,158 -5,877 -10,530 -8,272 -10,438 -2,703 
7 254 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -3,369 -5,667 -6,112 -11,324 -11,710 -6,536 
8 254 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -655 -3,597 -2,046 -3,375 -963 
9 252 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 652 -6,315 -7,910 -4,460 
10 254 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -12,367 -9,587 7,771 
Sum(0,+1
0)  
 
-944 1,144 -9 6,577 -256 -46 -728 -28,104 -29,584 -57,764 -81,359 -101,194 -56,754 
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Table IX 
Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
Sorted based on Favorable and Unfavorable Amendments 
 
In this table we show abnormal short selling activity around favorable and unfavorable loan 
amendments during the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 2007. An amendment is 
categorized as favorable, when changes include a larger loan amount, lower interest rate, and 
extended maturity. An amendment is categorized as unfavorable when changes include smaller 
loan amount, higher interest rate, and shortened maturity. Favorable loan amendments are 
defined as amendments with at least one favorable term change, but no unfavorable term change. 
The amendments other than favorable ones are therefore defined as unfavorable amendments.  
 
Panel A: Hedge Fund Borrowers Sample 
 Panel A.1: Favourable Amendments 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.035 -0.179** 0.144 -0.064 0.154 -0.007 -0.103 -0.109 
t-statistics -0.19 -2.25 0.94 -0.38 0.98 -0.07 -0.98 -0.61 
Num of Observations 76 76 76 76 76 73 72 73 
         
 Panel A.2: Unfavourable Amendments 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol 0.897** 0.328* 0.569** 0.778* 0.549* 0.276 0.108 0.380 
t-statistics 2.13 1.75 2.10 1.86 1.71 1.51 0.90 1.44 
Num of Observations 37 37 37 37 37 34 33 34 
         
 Panel A.3: Mean Difference Test (Favorable – Unfavorable) 
Mean difference (A.1 – A.2)  -0.932** -0.507** -0.425 -0.841* -0.395 -0.283 -0.211 -0.489 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) -2.03 -2.49 -1.37 -1.87 -1.10 -1.37 -1.32 -1.54 
 
Panel B: Bank Borrowers Sample 
 Panel B.1: Favourable Amendments 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.601** -0.291** -0.310** -0.56** -0.33** -0.273** -0.209** -0.480** 
t-statistics -2.37 -2.20 -2.28 -2.38 -2.10 -2.08 -2.16 -2.28 
Num of Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 125 126 
         
 Panel B.2: Unfavourable Amendments 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.132 -0.073 -0.059 -0.119 -0.027 -0.108 -0.043 -0.151 
t-statistics -0.73 -0.81 -0.53 -0.70 -0.26 -0.97 -0.50 -0.86 
Num of Observations 137 136 137 137 137 137 134 137 
         
 Panel B.3: Mean Difference Test (Favorable – Unfavorable) 
Mean difference (B.1 – B.2) -0.469 -0.217 -0.251 -0.441 -0.306 -0.164 -0.166 -0.329 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) -1.50 -1.36 -1.43 -1.52 -1.60 -0.95 -1.28 -1.20 
 
 Panel C: Mean Difference Test of Unfavorable Amendments (Hedge Fund - Bank) 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean difference (A.2-B.2) 1.029** 0.402* 0.628** 0.897* 0.577* 0.384* 0.151 0.531* 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 2.25 1.92 2.15 1.99 1.70 1.80 1.02 1.67 
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Table X 
Abnormal Short-Selling Activity Around Loan Amendments 
Sorted Based Changes by Highest and Lowest EDF Quintiles 
 
In this Table we show abnormal short selling results based on sorting loan amendments by 
changes in expected Default Frequency (EDF) for the sample period from 2nd 2005 to July 6th 
2007. We sort changes in EDF into quintiles. Changes in EDF are defined as the difference 
between the EDF estimated at the month end of the amendment announcement date and the EDF 
estimated 6 months prior to the announcement date. The lowest quintile contains observations 
whose EDFs have decreased most, whereas the highest quintile contains observations whose 
EDFs have increased the most. The largest decreases in EDF are more likely to be associated 
with unfavorable changes in the borrowers’ financial conditions. 
 
Panel A: Hedge Fund Borrower Sample 
 Panel A.1: Lowest Quintile of Change in EDF 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol  -0.095 -0.153 0.058 -0.079 0.074 -0.130 -0.249* -0.380 
t-statistics -0.32 -0.82 0.22 -0.29 0.32 -0.75 -1.93 -1.40 
Num of Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
         
 Panel A.2: Highest Quintile of Change in EDF 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol  1.369** 0.172 1.197** 1.242* 1.199** 0.342 0.153 0.495 
t-statistics 2.21 0.63 2.75 2.07 2.42 1.34 0.62 1.03 
Num of Observations 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 18 
         
 Panel A.3: Mean Difference Test (Lowest – Highest) 
Mean difference (A.1 – A.2) -1.464** -0.325 -1.139** -1.321* -1.125** -0.472 -0.402 -0.875 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) -2.12 -0.99 -2.24 -2.01 -2.05 -1.53 -1.45 -1.58 
 
 
Panel B: Bank Borrower Sample 
 Panel B.1: Lowest Quintile of Change in EDF 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.306 -0.141 -0.164 -0.315 -0.326 0.014 -0.096 -0.082 
t-statistics -0.67 -0.61 -0.66 -0.74 -0.96 0.06 -0.56 -0.21 
Num of Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
         
 Panel B.2: Highest Quintile of Change in EDF 
Mean cumulative abnormal Short/Avol -0.994*** -0.507*** -0.487** -0.922*** -0.405** -0.445* -0.244 -0.684* 
t-statistics -2.76 -3.19 -2.22 -2.84 -2.16 -1.94 -1.43 -1.83 
Num of Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 45 46 
         
 Panel B.3: Mean Difference Test (Lowest – Highest) 
Mean difference (B.1 – B.2) 0.688 0.365 0.323 0.608 0.078 0.459 0.148 0.602 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 1.18 1.30 0.98 1.14 0.20 1.36 0.62 1.11 
 
 
 Panel C: Mean Difference Test of Highest Quintile of Change in EDF (Hedge Fund -Bank) 
 (-10,0) (-10,-6) (-5,0) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (0,+5) (+6,+10) (0,+10) 
Mean difference (A.2-B.2) 2.362*** 0.679** 1.684*** 2.164*** 1.603*** 0.787** 0.397 1.179* 
Mean difference test (t-statistics) 3.30 2.16 3.45 3.17 3.02 2.29 1.33 1.94 
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Figure I: Short-Selling Activity around Loan Origination 
This Figure shows short-selling activity around the loan origination (day 0). Panel A plots the 
abnormal shorting activity of the equity of the treatment sample (hedge fund borrowers) and 
those of the matched sample (bank borrowers). Shorting actitivity is measured as the ratio of 
daily total number of shares being shorted to the average daily trading volume over the window 
(-120,-61) (Short/Avol). For any given borrower, the benchmark “normal” shorting activity is 
defined as the company’s average Short/Avol ratio over the period from January 2nd 2005 to July 
6th 2007 but excluding the event period(s), which is the window (-60, +60). The darker column 
plots the abnormal daily Short/Avol ratio of the treatment sample, and the lighter column 
represents the same ratio for the matched sample. The matching is based on regression I in Table 
III. We winsorize the abnormal short-selling activity at the 2% and 98% percentiles for each 
sample each day. Panel B presents the Cumulative abnormal Short/Avol ratios over the (-10, 0, 
+10) window. 
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Figure II 
Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
 
This Figure depicts short-selling activity around the announcement date (day 0) of loan 
amendments. The darker columns and lighter columns depict abnormal shorting activity of the 
equity of hedge fund borrowers (114 observations on day 0) and of bank borrowers (267 
observations on day 0), respectively. Abnormal Short/Avol is defined in Figure I.  
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Figure III 
Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
Sorted by Favorable and unfavorable Amendments 
 
This Figure contrasts the daily abnormal Short/Avol around favorable amendments with those 
around non-favorable amendments in each of the hedge fund borrowers (Panel A) and bank 
borrowers (Panel B) samples. Favorable term changes include larger loan amounts, lower interest 
rates and longer maturities. Unfavorable term changes include smaller loan amounts, higher 
interest rates and shorter maturities. Favorable loan amendments are defined as amendments with 
at least one favorable term change, but no unfavorable term change. The amendments other than 
favorable ones are therefore defined as unfavorable amendments.  
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Figure IV 
Abnormal Short-Selling Activity around Loan Amendments 
Sorted by Lowest and Highest Quintile of Changes in EDF 
  
This Figure shows the abnormal Short/Avol around loan amendments of the quintle with lowest 
changes in EDF and those of the quitle with highest changes in EDF. Lowest quintile contains 
observations whose EDFs decreased most around the loan amendment date, whereas highest 
quintile contains observations whose EDFs have increased most. Loan amendments with the 
lowest decrease in EDF are more likely to be caused by unfavorable changes in the borrowers’ 
financial condition. Panel A and Panel B presents the Hedge Fund Borrower sample and Bank 
Borrower sample, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Variable Description 
 
Variable Description 
Short/Avol Shorting actitivity (Short/Avol), is measured as the ratio of daily total number 
of shares being shorted to average daily volume over the window (-120, -61), 
adjusted to change in number of shares outstanding. 
 
Abnormal 
Short/Avol 
Short/Avol minus benchmark, which is defined as the average Short/Avol ratio 
over the period from January 1st 2005 to July 6th 2007 but excluding event 
periods (-60,+60). 
 
Short/SHROUT 
 
The ratio of daily total number of shares being shorted to the total number of 
shares outstanding. 
 
Abnormal 
Short/SHROUT 
 
Short/SHROUT minus benchmark, which is defined as the average 
Short/SHROUT ratio over the period from January 1st 2005 to July 6th 2007 
but excluding event periods (-60,+60).  
 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets (COMPUSTAT data 6) in 2007 dollars. All 
operating performances are measured with COMPUSTAT data at the last fiscal 
year-end at least 3 months prior to the loan origination date. 
 
Altman’s Z Score For manufacturing firms, Z=1.2×(Working Capitals/Total Assets) + 
1.4×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3× (EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6×(Mkt 
Value of Equity/ Book Value of Total Liabilities) + 1.0× Sales/Total Assets. 
For non-manufacturing firms, Z=6.56×(Working Capitals/Total Assets) + 
3.26×(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 6.72×(EBIT/Total Assets) + 
1.05×(Mkt Value of Equity/ Book Value of Total Liabilities). 
 
Expected Default 
Frequency 
The estimated probability of default based on Bharath and Shumway’s method 
(2004), which is a simplified version of KMV-Merton model. 
 
Cash/assets Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets (data1/data6). 
 
Net worth/assets Ratio of net worth to total assets ([data6-data181]/data6). 
 
EBIT/assets Ratio of Earnings Before Interests and Tax to total assets 
([data18+data16+data15]/data6). 
 
Book to Market Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
(data60/[data25*data199]). 
 
Tobin’s q Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets 
([data6+data25*data199-data60-data74]/data6). 
 
Leverage Sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets 
([data9+data34]/data6). 
 
Growth of sales Average rate of sales (data12 in 2007 dollars) growth over 3 years prior to loan 
origination date. 
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Profit Margin Ratio of income before extraordinary items to sales (data18/data12). 
 
ROE Return on equity (data18/data60). 
 
ROA Return on asset (data18/data6). 
 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio of gross earnings divided to the sum of total interest expense and 
capitalized interests ([data178+data61]/[data15+data147]). 
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors, measured as the average of 
last 4 quarters at least 3 month prior to loan origination date based on 
Thomason Financial 13F database. 
 
Beta Estimated coefficients based on the market model, calculated over the interval 
(-360, -61). 
 
RMSE  Estimated room mean squared error based on the market model, calculated over 
the interval [-360, -61]. 
 
Run-up Holding period return over the estimation window [-360, -61]. 
 
∆Performance Performance at (t+1) minus performance at (t-1). Performance at (t+1) is 
measured at the earliest fiscal year end at least 3 months after the loan 
origination date. Similarly performance at (t-1) is measured at the last fiscal 
year-end at least 3 months prior to the loan origination date. Changes in sales 
(∆Sales) refers to the ratio of (Salest+1 - Salest-1)/Salest-1. 
 
Investment  
Grade 
 
Investment Grade indicates whether the borrower was at investment grade at 
the loan close day. It equals 1 if the S&P senior long-term debt was rated at 
“BBB” or higher and 0 for the rest. 
Covenant Covenant equals 1 if at least one facility of a loan has any covenant, and 0 
otherwise. 
Secured 
 
Secured is an indicator of whether a loan deal is secured or not. It equals 1 if at 
least one facility is secured, and 0 otherwise. 
HighLever 
 
HighLever refers to the Highly Leveraged Loan indicator variable (1 for Highly 
Leveraged Loan and 0 otherwise).  
 
Cum. Loan 
 
Cum. Loan refers to the natural logarithm of the cumulative amount of loans a 
company has borrowed (in million dollars) within the past five years before the 
current loan deal. 
 
HighLever×Cum. 
Loan 
HighLever×Cum. Loan refers to the interaction of HighLever and Cum .Loan.  
 
 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Indicators for year of loan deal origination 
 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Indicators of 30 major industry classes defined by Fama-French 
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Appendix B: Switching Regression with Endogenous Switching (SRES) 
Results 
 
Table B.1. SRES Stage One Results: Determinants of Borrowing from Hedge Fund 
Borrowers from 1995 to the July 6th 2007 
 
In Table I we report the Probit regression results for the choice between hedge fund loans and 
bank loans. The dependent equals to 1 if at least one lender is a hedge fund and 0 if all lenders 
are banks. Our instrument variable is the interaction of HighLever and Cum. Loan. 
(HighLever×Cum Loan), where Cum Loan refers to the natural logarithm of the cumulative 
amount of loans a company has borrowed within the past five years before the current loan deal 
and HighLever refers to the Highly Leveraged Loan indicator variable (1 for Highly Leveraged 
Loan and 0 otherwise).  
 
Determinants of Borrowing from Hedge Funds 
(Hedge Fund=1) 
Variables Coeff.  z stats. 
Size (log assets) 0.298 *** 11.07 
Leverage 0.890 *** 5.71 
EBIT/Assets 0.749 ** 1.97 
Book-to-market -0.127 * -1.81 
RMSE 0.072 *** 2.77 
Runup 0.148 *** 2.61 
Sale Growth 0.017  0.19 
Institutional Ownership 0.557 *** 4.40 
Investment Grade -0.473 *** -4.29 
Covenant 0.059  0.72 
Secured 0.650 *** 8.00 
HighLever×Cum. Loan 0.090 *** 5.82 
Constant -4.677 *** -14.28 
Year effect  Yes   
Observations 4885   
Chi Square 336.78   
Pseudo R-square 0.201   
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Table B.2. SRES Stage 2 Results: Determinants of Abnormal Short Selling for  
the Period from 2005 to the July 6th 2007 
This Table reports the results of the second-stage regressions for the two abnormal short selling 
equations, one for the hedge fund borrowers and one for the bank borrowers. We report the mean 
difference between the coefficients of hedge fund and bank borrower regressions and its Z-
statistics.  Abnormal short selling is measured as the cumulative of Short/SHROUT ratio over 
window (-10, -1). IMR is the Inverse Mills-Ratio variable used to adjust for self-selection, as 
discussed in the text. In order to estimate consistent standard errors in the second stage, we 
employ the bootstrap procedure with 50 replications in these regressions. 1 
 
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Short/SHROUT over window (-10, -1)  (%) 
 Hedge Fund  Bank Hedge Fund- Bank 
 Coeff.  Z-stat. Coeff. z-stat. Diff. in coeff.  Z-stat. 
Size (log assets) 1.600 ** 2.39 0.172 *** 3.78 1.428 * 1.86 
Leverage 4.421  1.57 -0.268  -1.17 4.688  1.44 
EBIT/Assets 1.525  0.36 -0.252  -0.38 1.776  0.37 
Book-to-market 1.001  0.67 -0.107  -0.66 1.109  0.69 
RMSE 0.942 * 1.79 0.254 *** 3.73 0.688  1.24 
Runup 0.017  0.02 0.496 *** 2.76 -0.479  -0.52 
Sale Growth -1.097  -0.94 0.192  1.12 -1.289  -1.00 
Institutional Ownership 0.573  0.41 0.490 ** 2.09 0.082  0.05 
Investment Grade -3.051 * -1.79 -0.371 *** -2.91 -2.680  -1.45 
Covenant 1.804  1.38 0.070  0.69 1.735  1.46 
Secured 2.650 * 1.91 0.023  0.18 2.627 * 1.70 
IMR 3.965 * 1.90 0.070  0.14 3.896 * 1.68 
Constant -16.228  -1.55 -1.394 *** -3.67 -14.834  -1.25 
Year effect Yes   Yes      
Observations 72   613      
Adjusted R-square 0.164   0.096      
 
 
                                                 
1 We thank Bill Greene of New York University for his suggestion regarding correction of the error terms in the 
second stage of SRES. 
